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Aggregate marginal costs of public funds*
John K. Dagsvik** 
Steinar Strøm**
Steinar Strøm
Affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, the University of Turin and the Ragnar Frisch Centre, Oslo, Norway
 0000-0002-6873-572X
Article | Year: 2022 | Pages: 239 - 260 | Issue: 2 Received: June 1, 2021 | Accepted: December 24, 2021 | Published online: June 1, 2022
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FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
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Male income, Ymale
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Tax T
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0 – 41,907
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0
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41,907 – 140,500
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0.302Ymale – 12,656
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140,500 – 252,000
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0.358Ymale – 20,524
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252,000 – 263,000
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0.453Ymale – 44,464
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263,000 –
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0.495Ymale – 55,510
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Wage income, Y
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Tax T
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0 – 20,954
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0
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20,954 – 140,500
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0.302Ymale – v6,328
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140,500 – 208,000
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0.358Ymale – 14,196
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208,000 – 236,500
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0.453Ymale – 33,956
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236,500 –
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0.495Ymale – 43,889
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Table B1Tax function in 1994 for a married non-working woman whose husband is working, 1994 DISPLAY Table
Table B2Tax function in 1994 for a married working woman NOK 1994 DISPLAY Table
** We are grateful for comments by Terje Skjerpen and two anonymous referees. We also thank Marilena Locatelli for her assistance.
1 Some of the results in this paper were also obtained in Dagsvik, Strøm and Locatelli (  2014).
2 For a recent discussion of applying aggregate money metrics in welfare analysis, see Bosmans, Decancq and Ooghe ( 2018).
3 In the traditional case utility is assumed to be quasi-concave to ensure a unique maximum. In the discrete
case with finite D this assumption is no longer needed.
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June, 2022
II/2022
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