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Design of fiscal consolidation packages and model-based fiscal multipliers in Croatia*
Milan Deskar-Škrbić**
Darjan Milutinović**
Darjan Milutinović
Affiliation: Croatian National Bank, Economic Analysis Department, Zagreb, Croatia
0000-0001-5010-7437
Article | Year: 2021 | Pages: 1 - 61 | Volume: 45 | Issue: 1 Received: June 1, 2020 | Accepted: December 4, 2020 | Published online: March 9, 2021
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FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
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2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
|
Structural revenue measures
|
|
|
|
|
|
Increase of the health
contributions rate
|
|
0,5
|
0,2
|
|
|
Increase of the pension
contributions revenues
|
|
0,1
|
0,1
|
0,01
|
|
Increase of intermediate VAT
rate
|
|
0,2
|
|
|
|
Increase in excises on oil
derivatives
|
|
0,1
|
0,1
|
0,04
|
|
Increase of excise rate on
tobacco
|
|
0,03
|
0,04
|
0,01
|
|
Changes in tax on games of
chance
|
|
0,03
|
0,01
|
|
|
Limitation of CIT tax relief
|
|
|
0,1
|
|
|
Introduction of tax on
interest on savings
|
|
|
0,1
|
|
|
Total structural revenue
measures
|
|
1,0
|
0,7
|
0,1
|
|
Structural expenditure
measures
|
|
|
|
|
|
3% cut of public sector
wages
|
-0,2
|
-0,1
|
|
|
|
Cancelation of the holiday
bonus
|
-0,1
|
|
|
|
|
Abolishment of the service
loyalty bonus
|
|
-0,1
|
|
|
|
Reduction of subsidies
|
|
-0,3
|
-0,1
|
-0,2
|
|
Constraining intermediate
consumption
|
|
-0,2
|
|
-0,1
|
|
Government investment cut
|
|
-0,4
|
-0,1
|
-0,1
|
|
Social benefits savings
|
|
-0,2
|
-0,1
|
|
|
Total structural expenditure
measures
|
-0,3
|
-1,3
|
-0,2
|
-0,3
|
|
Total structural measures
|
0,3
|
2,2
|
0,9
|
0,4
|
Note: structural increase of pension contribution revenues is related to the transfer of public employees with accelerated pension plan from the 2nd to the 1st pension pillar. Source: National budget; EC; authors’ calculations.
Source: Eurostat; EC; authors’ calculations.
Source: Eurostat; EC; authors’ calculations.
Note: numbers in brackets correspond to respective model equation. Source: authors.
|
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
Average
|
|
Indirect taxes
|
0.0
|
-0.1
|
-0.1
|
-0.1
|
|
Personal
income tax
|
|
-0.2
|
-0.3
|
-0.2
|
|
Corporate
income tax
|
|
-0.2
|
-0.2
|
-0.2
|
|
Healthcare
contribution
|
0.0
|
-0.1
|
0.0
|
-0.1
|
Source: authors’ calculations.
|
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
Average
|
|
Public wages
|
1.2
|
1.3
|
1.3
|
1.3
|
|
Intermediate
consumption
|
0.6
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
0.6
|
|
Subsidies
|
0.0
|
0.1
|
0.1
|
0.1
|
|
Investments
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
0.7
|
0.7
|
|
Social
benefits
|
0.2
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
Source: authors’ calculations.
|
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
|
Structural revenue measures
|
|
|
|
|
|
Increase of the healthcare contributions rate
|
|
0,5
|
0,2
|
|
|
Transfer of pension contributions
|
|
0,1
|
0,1
|
0,01
|
|
Increase of intermediate VAT rate
|
|
0,2
|
|
|
|
Increase in excises on oil derivatives
|
|
0,1
|
0,1
|
0,04
|
|
Increase of excise rate on tobacco
|
|
0,03
|
0,04
|
0,01
|
|
Changes in tax on games of chance
|
|
0,03
|
0,01
|
|
|
Limitation of CIT tax relief
|
|
|
0,1
|
|
|
Introduction of tax on interest on savings
|
|
|
0,1
|
|
|
Total structural revenue measures
|
|
1,0
|
0,7
|
0,1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Structural expenditure measures
|
|
|
|
|
|
3% cut of public sector wages
|
-0.2
|
-0.1
|
|
|
|
Cancellation of holiday bonus
|
-0.3 (0.0)
|
|
|
|
|
Abolishment of service loyalty bonuses
|
|
-0.1 (0.0)
|
|
|
|
Reduction of capital transfers
|
|
0.0
(-0.2)
|
0.0
(-0.2)
|
0.0
(-0.2)
|
|
Reduction of subsidies
|
0.0 (-0.3)
|
-0.3 (-0.2)
|
-0.1 (-0.2)
|
-0.2 (-0.2)
|
|
Constraining intermediate consumption
|
|
-0.2
|
|
-0.1
|
|
Government investment cut
|
|
-0.4 (0.0)
|
-0.1 (0.0)
|
-0.1 (0.0)
|
|
Social benefits savings
|
|
-0.2
|
-0.1
|
|
|
Total structural expenditure measures
|
-0.3 (-0.5)
|
-1.3 (-0.9)
|
-0.2 (-0.4)
|
-0.3 (-0.4)
|
|
Total structural measures
|
0.3
(0.5)
|
2.2
(1.9)
|
0.9
(1.1)
|
0.4
(0.5)
|
Note: new measures of the growth-friendly fiscal consolidation package are bolded in parenthesis. The rest of the measures of the growth-friendly fiscal consolidation package are the same as in the original EDP scenario. Source: authors.
|
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
|
EDP
|
1.3
|
0.6
|
0.7
|
0.6
|
|
Growth-friendly
|
0.6
|
0.3
|
0.1
|
0.2
|
Source: authors.
Source: authors’ calculations.
Note: these figures shows only key endogenous macro and fiscal variables; figures of other variables are available upon request. Source: authors.
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Research
Fiscal
instrument
|
Coenen,
Kilponen and Trabandt (2010)
|
Cournede,
Goujard and Pina (2013)
|
Gechert
(2015)
|
Kilponen
et al. (2019)
|
Snudden
and Klyuev (2011)
|
Muir
and Weber (2013)
|
Zubairy
(2014)
|
|
Public expenditures
|
Government consumption (G)
|
0.7-0.8
|
0.6-0.8
|
0.8
|
0.5-0.9
|
0.4
|
0.5
|
0.8-0.9
|
|
Social transfers
|
0.0-0.2
|
0.2-0.5
|
0.4
|
|
0.1
|
0.1
|
|
|
Public investment
|
0.8-1.1
|
1.3
|
1.4
|
|
0.4
|
0.6
|
|
|
Subsidies
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Public revenues
|
Personal income tax
|
0.2-0.3
|
0.2-0.5
|
|
0.0-0.5
|
0.1
|
0.4
|
0.3-0.4
|
|
Corporate income tax
|
0.1-0.1
|
|
|
0.1-0.3
|
|
0.5
|
|
|
Social contributions
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Indirect taxes
|
0.1-0.3
|
0.1-0.3
|
|
0.1-0.7
|
0.1
|
0.3
|
|
|
Country
|
Euro area/EU
|
OECD
|
meta study
|
Euro area countries
|
Czechia
|
Bulgaria
|
USA
|
|
Model
|
DSGE
|
semi-structural
|
across models
|
across models
|
DSGE
|
DSGE
|
DSGE
|
Source: authors.
|
Revenues
|
Expenditures
|
|
2014
|
|
· Increase
of the rate of healthcare contributions from 13% to 15% (0.49% of GDP)
· Increased
social security contributions due to the shift of part of the future pension
contributions to the first pillar (0.12% of GDP)
· Higher
fuel excises (0.11% of GDP)
· Other
revenues side measures: changes in the lottery and gambling taxes, SOEs
dividend and profit withdrawal, increase of telecom fees and other concession
fees (0.1% of GDP)
· increase
of reduced VAT rate from 10% to 13% (0.12% of GDP)
|
· Lower intermediate
consumption due to savings, among other, on maintenance costs, transportation
costs, IT services (0.3% of GDP)
· Reduction
of subsidies, mostly to shipyards, HBOR and railways (0.4% of GDP)
· Savings
in social transfers, mostly in the health sector and privileged pension
outlays (0.3% of GDP)
· Reduction
of current and capital transfers, mostly due to replacement with EU funding
(0.1% of GDP)
· Reduction
of subsidies (0.2% of GDP)
· Lower
public investment (0.1% of GDP)
· Extrabudgetary
users and other general government entities, mainly in Croatian Roads and
Croatian Waters (0.4% of GDP)
· Savings
on general government compensation of employees (0.2% of GDP)
|
|
2015
|
|
· Increase
of the rate of healthcare contributions from 13% to 15% (0.25% of GDP) - a residual effect of the measure introduced in
2014;
· Changes
in the lottery and gambling taxes (0.05% of GDP) - a
residual effect of the measure introduced in 2014;
· Increased
social security contributions due to the shift of part of the future pension
contributions to the first pillar (0.04% of GDP) - a
residual effect of the measure introduced in 2014;
· Tax on
savings interest (0.07% of GDP);
· Higher
fuel and tobacco excises (0.16% of GDP).
|
· Reduction
of subsidies for agriculture, active labor market policies and Croatian Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (0.03% of GDP)
· Social
benefits savings on housing loan subsidies and preferential pensions above
5000 HRK, and consolidation of social benefits (0.05% of GDP)
· Savings
of extrabudgetary users, in particular Croatian Waters, Croatian Health
Insurance Fund, Croatian Highways, Croatian Railway Infrastructure (0.5% of
GDP);
· Reduction
of transfers, mainly guarantee funds (0.13% of GDP);
· Reduction
of investment expenditure of the central and local government units (0.5% of
GDP).
|
|
2016
|
|
· SOEs
dividend and profit withdrawal (0.2% of GDP);
· Higher
fuel and tobacco excises (0.06% of GDP) - a
residual effect of the measure introduced in 2014
· New
treatment of reinvested earnings in the corporate income tax system (0.15% of
GDP)
· Introduction
of capital gains tax
|
· Lower
intermediate consumption due to implementation of "standard material
costs guidelines" (0.05% of GDP);
· Further
reduction of subsidies of some activities and substitution with EU funds
(0.16% of GDP);
· Reduction
of social benefits through their further integration and decreasing
unemployment (0.13% of GDP)
· Savings
in other transfers through expiry of certain programs and substitution with
EU funds (0.21% of GDP);
· Reduction
of investment expenditure in defense, health, education, science (0.07% of
GDP)
|
|
2017
|
|
|
· Reduction
of investment expenditure of the central and local government units (0.5% of
GDP)
· Reduction
of capital transfers (0.5% of GDP)
|
Source: European Commission, Assessments of the Convergence Program (different years); authors.
|
Real
GDP growth %
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
|
No policy change
|
0.5
|
1.2
|
1.7
|
|
EDP scenario
|
-1.0
|
0.6
|
1.1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Required structural measures, % of GDP
|
2.3
|
1.0
|
1.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Structural balance, no policy change
|
-5.9
|
-5.8
|
-6.1
|
|
Structural balance, EDP scenario
|
-4.0
|
-3.1
|
-2.4
|
|
General government balance, no policy change
|
-6.4
|
-6.0
|
-6.0
|
|
General government balance, EDP scenario
|
-4.6
|
-3.5
|
-2.7
|
|
General government debt, no policy change
|
64.7
|
68.8
|
72.3
|
|
General government debt, EDP scenario
|
63.9
|
66.1
|
66.8
|
Source: European Commission (2013a)
|
2013
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
2017
|
|
Q2
|
Q3
|
Q4
|
Q1
|
Q2
|
Q3
|
Q4
|
Q1
|
Q2
|
Q3
|
Q4
|
Q1
|
Q2
|
Q3
|
Q4
|
Q1
|
Q2
|
Q3
|
|
Pre-EDP consolidation phase
|
Main EDP consolidation phase
|
Implementation phase of the EDP measures
|
|
|
|
Croatia joins EU
|
EC proposes opening of EDP for Croatia
|
Council opens EDP for Croatia
|
Main EDP fiscal package of measures
|
EC gives positive assessment of the fiscal
effort
|
EDP in
abeyance
|
EC proposes closing of EDP for Croatia
|
Council closes EDP for Croatia
|
Source: authors.
Source : authors.
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March, 2021 I/2021
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