530
Views
146
Downloads |
Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery
Abbas Khandan* 
Article | Year: 2022 | Pages: 421 - 450 | Volume: 46 | Issue: 3 Received: April 18, 2021 | Accepted: May 23, 2022 | Published online: August 29, 2022
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
Source: Author's estimates.
|
|
Min
|
Mean
|
Max
|
Range
|
|
Lobbying
|
18.39
|
58.76
|
89.76
|
0-100
|
|
Bribery
|
35.24
|
76.84
|
95.07
|
1-100
|
|
GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted 2017
US dollars)
|
2,103.5
|
22,551.6
|
97,801
|
|
|
Confidence in the judiciary
|
1.533
|
2.548
|
3.246
|
1-4
|
|
Confidence in the press
|
0.81
|
1.317
|
1.893
|
1-4
|
|
Economic instability
|
30.03
|
53.27
|
75.24
|
0-100
|
|
Social disapproval of bribery
|
6.78
|
9.01
|
9.82
|
1-10
|
|
Government expenditures
|
5.6
|
14.68
|
20.77
|
0-100
|
|
Linkage costs
|
2.02
|
3.88
|
6.3
|
1-10
|
|
Business cooperation
|
3.7
|
22.29
|
54
|
0-100
|
|
Model 2
|
Model 1
|
|
|
Lobby
|
LN (Bribery)
|
Lobby
|
Bribery
|
|
|
|
0.0006
(0.0002)***
|
|
0.0001
(0.005)
|
Lobbying
|
|
0.14
(0.24)
|
|
0.18
(0.25)
|
|
Bribery
|
|
8.2
(3.01)***
|
-0.0097
(0.0044)**
|
8.32
(3.23)**
|
0.021
(0.14)
|
LN (GDP per capita)
|
|
|
|
-0.084
(0.24)
|
0.01
(0.009)
|
Economic
Instability
|
|
|
-0.26
(0.054)***
|
|
-4.3
(1.7)**
|
Confidence in the Judicial
System
|
|
|
-0.021
(0.012)*
|
|
0.13
(0.38)
|
Confidence
in the Press
|
|
|
-0.053
(0.016)***
|
|
-6.8
(0.51)***
|
Social disapproval
of bribery
|
|
|
0.00056
(0.0002)***
|
|
0.094
(0.006)***
|
Interaction
(Social disapproval x Bribery)
|
|
|
0.0035
(0.0006)***
|
|
0.043
(0.02)**
|
Interaction (Confidence
in the Judiciary x Bribery)
|
|
2.31
(0.63)***
|
|
1.81
(0.62)***
|
|
Gov.
Expenditures
|
|
-9.76
(4.57)**
|
|
-2.41
(2.83)
|
|
Linkage Costs
|
|
-0.923
(0.63)
|
|
0.28
(17.1)
|
|
Business
Cooperation
|
|
0.34
(0.17)**
|
|
|
|
Interaction (Business
Cooperation x Linkage Cost)
|
|
-35.04
(38.9)
|
4.49
(0.067)***
|
-54.15
(39.6)
|
75.46
(2.24)***
|
Constant
|
|
0.361
|
0.99
|
0.299
|
0.998
|
R-Square Adjusted
|
|
5.24
|
647.34
|
4.2
|
2616.9
|
F-test
statistic
|
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.002
|
0.000
|
F-test P-value
|
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of coefficients are shown by asterisk; *** (significant at 1%), ** (significant at 5%) and * (significant at 10%). Source: Author’s estimations.
Figure 1Global prevalence of lobbying and bribery, 2018 DISPLAY Figure
Figure 2An example of a road congestion game DISPLAY Figure
Table 1Preliminary statistics of variables DISPLAY Table
Table 2Estimations of corruption and lobbying DISPLAY Table
* The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions.
1 USD 205.4 million in 2010.
2 Although in the real world rival industries compete with each other, this study concentrates on firms within an industry having common interests where the issue relates only to cooperation in lobbying or acting individually.
3 Indirect punishment, known as selective incentive mechanism in the literature. For example, a trade union is able to create selective incentives by providing some excludable goods like insurance exclusively to its members. Withholding these goods from non-members is a form of punishment for non-cooperators.
4 Sandhom (  2010) has a thorough explanation of deterministic dynamics and their properties.
5 The reason for using the Word Values Survey ( 2018) is that there is a direct question about lobbying in its Wave 7 questionnaire. Information about lobbying activities is limited and, as far as I know, is not available in other worldwide databases. Although BEEPS’s older version of countrywide standardized questionnaire core2 for 2002 to 2005 asked enterprises about their lobbying activities, its newer core4 version for 2006 to 2019 unfortunately lacks it.
6 The Word Values Survey (WVS) is biased toward countries outside the European Union. The 46 countries surveyed by WVS (( 2018)) used in this study for estimation are: 7 in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), 5 in North America (Canada, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the United States), 7 in Europe (Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine), 21 in Asia (Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippine, Singapore, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Turkey), 4 in Africa (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe), and 2 in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). European Union countries are covered by the European Values Survey (EVS) which, unfortunately, does not report on lobbying activities.
7 The actual question is, “In your opinion, which one of these is most important? A stable economy, progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society, progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money, or the fight against crime?”
8 In linear-log equations, a 1 percent change in X has an effect of size β/100 on Y. Therefore, a ten percent change in per capita GDP increases the lobbying score by 0.82 points.
|
|
September, 2022
III/2022 |
