Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery
https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.46.3.5 | Published online: August 29, 2022 Figure 1
Global prevalence of lobbying and bribery, 2018 Figure 2
An example of a road congestion game Table 1
Preliminary statistics of variables
Table 2
Estimations of corruption and lobbying
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of coefficients are shown by asterisk; *** (significant at 1%), ** (significant at 5%) and * (significant at 10%). Source: Author’s estimations. This is an Open Access article distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC-BY-NC) which permits non commercial use and redistribution, as long as you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.
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September, 2022 III/2022 |
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