FIGURES & DATA
Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery
https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.46.3.5 | Published online: August 29, 2022
Global prevalence of lobbying and bribery, 2018
Source: Author's estimates.
An example of a road congestion game
Preliminary statistics of variables
Source: Author’s calculations.
Estimations of corruption and lobbying
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of coefficients are shown by asterisk; *** (significant at 1%), ** (significant at 5%) and * (significant at 10%).
Source: Author’s estimations.
Visits refer to users (not robots) and are expressed cumulatively .
Article visits include visits to the article web page and visits to all full text files regarding this article.
To obtain a more realistic insight into the actual visits and reduce the possibility of manipulation (manually or automated) the following records were filtered out:
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