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Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery
Abbas Khandan* 
Article | Year: 2022 | Pages: 421 - 450 | Volume: 46 | Issue: 3 Received: April 18, 2021 | Accepted: May 23, 2022 | Published online: August 29, 2022
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FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
Source: Author's estimates.
|
|
Min
|
Mean
|
Max
|
Range
|
|
Lobbying
|
18.39
|
58.76
|
89.76
|
0-100
|
|
Bribery
|
35.24
|
76.84
|
95.07
|
1-100
|
|
GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted 2017
US dollars)
|
2,103.5
|
22,551.6
|
97,801
|
|
|
Confidence in the judiciary
|
1.533
|
2.548
|
3.246
|
1-4
|
|
Confidence in the press
|
0.81
|
1.317
|
1.893
|
1-4
|
|
Economic instability
|
30.03
|
53.27
|
75.24
|
0-100
|
|
Social disapproval of bribery
|
6.78
|
9.01
|
9.82
|
1-10
|
|
Government expenditures
|
5.6
|
14.68
|
20.77
|
0-100
|
|
Linkage costs
|
2.02
|
3.88
|
6.3
|
1-10
|
|
Business cooperation
|
3.7
|
22.29
|
54
|
0-100
|
|
Model 2
|
Model 1
|
|
|
Lobby
|
LN (Bribery)
|
Lobby
|
Bribery
|
|
|
|
0.0006
(0.0002)***
|
|
0.0001
(0.005)
|
Lobbying
|
|
0.14
(0.24)
|
|
0.18
(0.25)
|
|
Bribery
|
|
8.2
(3.01)***
|
-0.0097
(0.0044)**
|
8.32
(3.23)**
|
0.021
(0.14)
|
LN (GDP per capita)
|
|
|
|
-0.084
(0.24)
|
0.01
(0.009)
|
Economic
Instability
|
|
|
-0.26
(0.054)***
|
|
-4.3
(1.7)**
|
Confidence in the Judicial
System
|
|
|
-0.021
(0.012)*
|
|
0.13
(0.38)
|
Confidence
in the Press
|
|
|
-0.053
(0.016)***
|
|
-6.8
(0.51)***
|
Social disapproval
of bribery
|
|
|
0.00056
(0.0002)***
|
|
0.094
(0.006)***
|
Interaction
(Social disapproval x Bribery)
|
|
|
0.0035
(0.0006)***
|
|
0.043
(0.02)**
|
Interaction (Confidence
in the Judiciary x Bribery)
|
|
2.31
(0.63)***
|
|
1.81
(0.62)***
|
|
Gov.
Expenditures
|
|
-9.76
(4.57)**
|
|
-2.41
(2.83)
|
|
Linkage Costs
|
|
-0.923
(0.63)
|
|
0.28
(17.1)
|
|
Business
Cooperation
|
|
0.34
(0.17)**
|
|
|
|
Interaction (Business
Cooperation x Linkage Cost)
|
|
-35.04
(38.9)
|
4.49
(0.067)***
|
-54.15
(39.6)
|
75.46
(2.24)***
|
Constant
|
|
0.361
|
0.99
|
0.299
|
0.998
|
R-Square Adjusted
|
|
5.24
|
647.34
|
4.2
|
2616.9
|
F-test
statistic
|
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.002
|
0.000
|
F-test P-value
|
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance of coefficients are shown by asterisk; *** (significant at 1%), ** (significant at 5%) and * (significant at 10%). Source: Author’s estimations.
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September, 2022
III/2022 |
