Public Sector Economics

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Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery



Abbas Khandan*
Article   |   Year:  2022   |   Pages:  421 - 450   |   Volume:  46   |   Issue:  3
Received:  April 18, 2021   |   Accepted:  May 23, 2022   |   Published online:  August 29, 2022
Download citation        https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.46.3.5       


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  September, 2022
III/2022
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