3159 Views
708 Downloads |
Fiscal councils’ impact on promoting transparency and accountability in public finance management
Sanja Bach*
Preliminary communication | Year: 2020 | Pages: 355 - 384 | Volume: 44 | Issue: 3 Received: October 19, 2018 | Accepted: April 4, 2020 | Published online: September 1, 2020
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
Questionnaire 1. How does your fiscal council communicate with the public? (multiple replies possible) - web page
- press releases
- briefings
- press conferences
- social groups (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.)
- interviews
- PR or marketing agency
- other, please specify
2. How often does your fiscal council communicate with the public? - a week
- a month
- quarterly
- semi-annually
- a year
- once a year
- other, please specify
3. When does your fiscal council usually communicate with the public? (multiple replies possible) - when there are significant fiscal events (planning the state budget, presenting the draft state budget, the debate on the state budget in Parliament, the execution of the state budget)
- when changes in fiscal policy are being announced
- when tax-policy is out of the set framework
- in the time of the release of the compliance/incompliance with fiscal rules
- ahead of parliamentary elections and during the election campaign in order for the voters to be fairly informed about fiscal policy
- in case of major failures in the conduction of fiscal policy
- other, please specify
4. What is the average annual media coverage of the activities of your fiscal council? - more than 10 releases in the media
- more than 20 releases in the media
- more than 50 releases in the media
- more than 100 releases in the media
- more than 150 releases in the media
- other, please specify
5. Which media issue the largest number of releases on the work of your fiscal council? - print media (dailies, weeklies, monthlies, etc.)
- electronic media (radio, television, etc.)
- digital media (social groups, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.)
- online media (news portals, etc.)
Additional information
6. Which area do most of the media reports address? (multiple replies possible) - activities of the Council
- analysis, assessments and reports of the Council
- criticism of the government's fiscal policy
- trends in deficit and public debt
- transparency and accountability in the budget process
- other, please specify
7. What international media does your fiscal council use to send a message about the government's fiscal policy to the world public? (multiple replies possible) - news agencies (Reuters, Bloomberg, etc.)
- The Financial Times and the like.
- The Economist and the like.
- international television channels (CNN, CNBC, etc.)
- they do not use any international media
- other, please specify
8. How much funding was allocated from the budget of your fiscal council for marketing and public relations in 2015 and 2016? (amount in EUR) - in 2015
- in 2016
- no data on the funding
9. Is the monitoring of the compliance with fiscal rules publicly available? (multiple replies possible) - on the web site of the Council
- via press releases
- via briefing with journalist
- via press conferences
- presented in the Parliament
- other, please specify
10. How do you assess the media visibility of the compliance with fiscal rules? - information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, followed by a public debate
- information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, no public debate
- information about this is published/broadcast only in some media
- there is no, or insufficient, information about this in the media
- other, please specify
11. How do you assess the media visibility of noncompliance with fiscal rules? - information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, followed by a public debate
- information about this is published/broadcast in all major media, no public debate
- information about this is published/broadcast only in some media
- there is not, or insufficient, information about this in the media
- other, please specify
12. Please describe the reaction of the government in relation to the assessment of noncompliance with national fiscal rules - reacts extremely negatively to the fiscal institution
- explains why it does not comply
- publicly announces it is taking corrective steps
- publicly explains why it does not take corrective steps
- usually does not react publicly
- other, please specify
13. How can IFIs contribute to the increase in the (politicians’) accountability for not complying with fiscal rules? (multiple replies possible) - by better informing the public through the media about the importance of the compliance with the rules and the consequences of the noncompliance
- by educating politicians
- by educating the public
- by the influence of IFIs through the media on the politicians’ reputations
- other, please specify
14. How to increase the media visibility of compliance with the rules? - by more efficient communication with the public
- by creating a communication strategy with the public
- by earmarking the funds for marketing
- by increasing the funds for marketing
- by selecting individuals that have communication skills to head the institution
- other, please specify
15. Please describe the reaction of the government to critical views by your fiscal council on fiscal policy published in the media? - The government generally respects the criticism, becoming more transparent and accountable.
- The government generally respects the criticism, but does not become more transparent and accountable.
- The government explains the reasons for the state of fiscal policy.
- The government rarely appreciates criticism.
- The government threatens that budgetary resources for the work of fiscal institutions will be reduced.
- The government reacts extremely negatively.
- The government generally does not react.
- Other, please specify
16. How does your fiscal council affect the fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? (multiple replies possible) - by promoting fiscal transparency and accountability
- by analysing fiscal transparency
- by supervising fiscal sustainability
- by preparing public reports that have significant media impact
- by promoting sound fiscal policy
- other, please specify
17. What do you see as the main cause of the growth of the deficits and public debts in your countries in the period from 2008 to 2015? (multiple replies possible) - excessive government spending in (good) times before the crisis
- poor risk management before the crisis
- inadequate and belated government response to the global financial crisis
- fiscal irresponsibility and lack of transparency
- politicians were disoriented during the crisis
- absence of fiscal rules
- noncompliance with fiscal rules
- non-existence of independent fiscal institutions
- introduction of flexible rules
- susceptibility to political discretion
- political misuse of state finances
- bad and irresponsible policies of EU member states
- increased spending before the elections and transfer of costs to the future generations
- insufficient and biased information to the public about the state of public finances
- there is no problem with deficit and public debt, and the public finances were stable
- other, please specify
18. Does the higher media visibility of the compliance with rules and more effective communication of IFIs contribute to transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? - yes, please specify how
- no, please specify reasons
19. How to increase the impact of IFIs on fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? - by strengthening the power of IFIs through changing national legislation
- by strengthening the power of IFIs through changing European legislation (Stability and Growth Pact)
- by more efficient communication with the public
- by increasing the number of public debates on fiscal policy in the media
- other, please specify
20. What are the obstacles to any increase in the impact of your fiscal council on fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? (multiple replies possible) - insufficient staffing of Council
- lack of a communication strategy with the public
- Council is not independent in the performance of its work
- government ignores Council media views on the state of fiscal policy
- media views and public discussions do not contribute to the better state of public finances
- low level of democracy in a society, which is why the impact of public has weakened
- low level of press freedom, which is why the media do not publish critical views on the government's fiscal policy
- other, please specify
21. How does the public respond to the information in the media about the lack of transparency and (politicians’) responsibility in the budget process? - by public debates and pressing politicians on more transparent and more responsible behaviour in the budget process
- by public discussions, but without pressing politicians on more transparent and more responsible behaviour in the budget process by constantly pressing politicians on more transparent and more responsible behaviour in the budget process
- has evidence of the lack of transparency and (politicians’) responsibility in the budget process, but is not responding
- has no knowledge of and shows no interest in the state of public finances
Additional information
22. How do you estimate the level of information of your citizens about the existence and activities of your fiscal council? - insufficient
- barely sufficient
- good
- very good
- exceptionally well-informed
Additional information
23. What has so far been the impact of your fiscal council on the public information about the state of public finances and on the increase in fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? - insufficient
- sufficient
- good
- very good
- excellent
Additional information
24. How do fiscal rules and IFIs influence transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? - by informing the public through media, and the public then influences the politicians’ reputation and rating at the elections
- by public disclosure of information about the compliance with fiscal rules and increased communication with the media
- by enhanced communication analysis, evaluation and reporting of independent fiscal institutions
- by promoting fiscal transparency and accountability
- by transparency of the work of an independent fiscal institution as an example of good practice
- Other, please specify
25. When does your fiscal council especially issue warnings about the state of public finances? (multiple replies possible) - in the event of a conflict between the proposed budget and the goals set out
- in the case of overoptimistic forecasts
- in the event of excessive government spending
- in the case of unsustainable tax policy
- in the case of worse fiscal performance than anticipated
- to indicate the actual state of fiscal policy
- to raise public awareness on the importance of sound public finances
- other, please specify
26. Do you think that fiscal rules and IFIs can be powerful communication tools in order to increase fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process? - yes, please specify how
- no, please specify reasons
Questions
(variable)
|
N
|
%
|
How does your fiscal council communicate with the
public?
|
18
|
100
|
How often does your fiscal council communicate with
the public?
|
16
|
89
|
What is the average annual media coverage of the
activities of your fiscal council?
|
13
|
72
|
Which of the media issues the largest number of releases
on the work of your fiscal council?
|
16
|
89
|
How do you assess the media visibility of compliance
with fiscal rules?
|
17
|
94
|
How do you assess the media visibility of
noncompliance with fiscal rules?
|
16
|
89
|
Please describe the reaction of the government in
relation to the assessment of noncompliance with national fiscal rules
|
15
|
83
|
How to increase the media visibility of compliance
with the rules?
|
15
|
83
|
Does the higher media visibility of compliance with the
rules and more effective communication of the council contribute to
transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process?
|
15
|
83
|
How to increase the impact of councils on fiscal
transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process?
|
11
|
61
|
How do you estimate the level of information of your
citizens about the existence and activities of your fiscal council?
|
15
|
83
|
What has so far been the impact of your fiscal
council on public information about the state of public finances and on the
increase in fiscal transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the
budget process?
|
17
|
94
|
How does the public respond to the information in
the media about the lack of transparency and about (politicians’) responsibility
in the budget process?
|
13
|
72
|
How do fiscal rules and fiscal councils influence
transparency and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process?
|
14
|
78
|
Do you think that fiscal rules and fiscal councils
can be powerful communication tools in order to increase fiscal transparency
and (politicians’) accountability in the budget process?
|
17
|
94
|
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Explanation of responses: Through the media – general information on public finances provided to the public through the media; Public information disclosure – by publicly disclosing information about compliance with fiscal rules and frequent communication with the media; Public disclosure of analysis, evaluation and reports – systematic communication of analysis, evaluation and reports produced by fiscal councils; Promoting transparency and accountability – general efforts to promote fiscal transparency and accountability; Promoting good practice – setting an example through the transparency of the work of the fiscal council.
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Communication modes
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
∑
|
website
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
18
|
press releases
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
16
|
briefing
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
6
|
press conferences
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
13
|
social groups
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
8
|
interviews
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
14
|
PR or marketing agencies
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
|
other
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
frequency
|
4
|
6
|
4
|
3
|
4
|
7
|
4
|
5
|
1
|
6
|
2
|
3
|
6
|
3
|
5
|
3
|
4
|
6
|
|
Source: Questionnaire responses.
Communications
|
Alerts
|
Media
releases
|
Most important fiscal events
|
Discrepancy between proposed budgets and fiscal goals /
over-optimistic forecasts
|
Analyses, evaluations and reports
|
Information on compliance / non-compliance with fiscal rules
|
Excessive spending / raising public awareness of sound public finances
|
Criticisms of government fiscal policy and of changes in fiscal deficits
and public debt
|
Announcement of fiscal policy changes / fiscal policy failures
|
Actual state of fiscal policy
|
Releases on transparency and accountability in the budget process / councils’
activities
|
Source: Questionnaire results and author’s comparison.
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
council’s web site
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
press releases
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
briefings with journalists
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
press conferences
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
presented in parliament
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
other, please specify
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: Germany – by presentation in the parliament and legally secured in special cases (presentation of reports in case of non-compliance with fiscal rules in the Federal Parliament and in the State Parliaments). Netherlands – The Quarterly Review, a CPB publication related to the budget cycle, provides numerous opportunities for assessing compliance with national and EU fiscal rules. Portugal – a web site release – in the annual fiscal performance reports, annual budget plans and medium-term stability programs. Sweden – annual report is published in electronic and printed form.
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
by strengthening
council’s power through national legislation changes
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
by strengthening council’s
power through changes in European legislation (SGP)
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
by more efficient
communication with the public
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
by increasing the number of
public debates on fiscal policy in the media
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
other, please specify
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
Source: Author’s questionnaire results.
Other: France – the influence is already high. Ireland – by producing quality analyses and effectively communicating the results with the parliament. Portugal – building a reputation is essential in order to ensure social significance. If quality or independence is lacking in its analysis, no marketing plan could preserve the fiscal council. Romania – by increasing the public awareness to be implicated in the process of how the government spend the public money, not just in the short-term but also in the medium-term. Sweden – A strong council needs a legislative background, but the legislative background does not guarantee a strong council. The strength of the institution ultimately depends on the quality and credibility of its work, not its legal status.
Country
|
Council
|
Year of founding
|
AT
|
Fiscal Advisory Council
|
2002
|
CY
|
Fiscal Council
|
2013
|
DK
|
Danish Economic Council
|
1962
|
FR
|
High Council for Public Finance (HCFB)
|
2013
|
EL
|
Parliamentary Budget Office
|
2010
|
HR
|
Commission on Fiscal Policy
|
2013
|
IE
|
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC)
|
2011
|
LT
|
State Audit Office
|
2013
|
LV
|
Fiscal Discipline Council
|
1990
|
LU
|
Court of Auditors
|
1999
|
HU
|
Fiscal Council
|
2009
|
MT
|
National Audit Office
|
2013
|
NL
|
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
|
1945
|
DE
|
Independent Advisory Board to the Stability Council
|
2013
|
PT
|
Public Finance Council
|
2012
|
RO
|
Fiscal Policy Council
|
2010
|
SE
|
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
|
2007
|
UK
|
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)
|
2010
|
Source: Author.
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
significant fiscal events
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
changes in in fiscal policy
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
tax policy is out of the framework
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
compliance/non-compliance with the rules
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
ahead of parliamentary elections and during the campaign
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
failures in fiscal policy
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
other
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
Source: Author's questionnaire results
Other: Austria - by publication calendar (studies, recommendations, etc.). Cyprus - every fall and spring (specified in legislation) if it considers that EU or national rules have been breached. Denmark - The Council meets twice a year and the Presidency prepare a report for each Council meeting. The report contains economic analysis and policy recommendations on economic policy, as well as short and medium-term forecasts on the key indicators of the Danish economy. The report also includes the Presidency assessment of fiscal policy goals – e.g. adherence to the national Budget Law, adherence to EU rules and assessment of long-term fiscal sustainability. The Presidency is independently responsible for the reports and acts as a Danish "fiscal watchdog". The preliminary version of the report is presented and discussed at the Council meeting. The reports are published immediately after the meeting. Council members' comments are added in the final version of the report. Following the Council meeting the Presidency holds a press conference. France - for each budget and SGP. Ireland - With regard to the first reply, the primary Council communicates with the public at the time of the release of the main reports. Council members and the president sometimes participate in media interviews throughout the year. The president usually participates in fewer media inclusions, the morning after the annual budget is announced in October each year, to give an initial reaction to the budget. Latvia - The Law on Fiscal Discipline gives the Latvian Fiscal Council a broad mandate (Article 28) so that it communicates in all cases where it considers it important. Netherlands - CPB publishes Quarterly Reviews, a budget cycle publication. This provides numerous opportunities for assessing compliance with national and EU fiscal rules. In September, opposition parties seek an analysis of their alternative budget. The CPB provides analysis of political parties' electoral programs. It also provides analysis of Government agreements and major additional policy packages. Portugal - usually when a publication is issued or when a senior council member intervenes at a public event. It publishes an average of 1.5 publications per month, but amount is not the same every month. Romania - on the eve of parliamentary elections and during the election campaign to keep voters impartially informed - only when the Council is asked. Sweden – FPC may decide to hold a press conference at a time when it believes there is a failure in fiscal policy (breach of fiscal rule) and a need for action (e.g. regarding fiscal effects of immigration in 2015). FPC does not hold regular press conferences and tries to stay away from direct involvement in the budget process or election campaigns. UK - in the case of significant fiscal developments and medium-term forecasts while all other outputs are published at a time of the institution’s own choosing.
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
conflict between proposed budget and goals set
out
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
overoptimistic forecasts
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
excessive government
spending
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
unsustainable tax policy
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
worse fiscal performance
than anticipated
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
indicate the actual state of
fiscal policy
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
to raise public awareness
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
other
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
Source: Author's questionnaire results
Other: Denmark - The Council meets twice a year and the Presidency prepares a report for each of the meetings. The report contains economic analysis and policy recommendations on economic policy, as well as short- and medium-term forecasts on the key indicators of the Danish economy. It also includes the Presidency assessment of fiscal policy goals – e.g. adherence to the national Budget Law and to EU rules, and assessment of long-term fiscal sustainability. The Presidency is independently responsible for the reports and acts as a Danish "fiscal watchdog". The preliminary version of the report is presented and discussed at the Council meeting. The reports are published immediately after the meeting. Council members' comments are added in the final version of the report. Following the Council meeting, the Presidency holds a press conference. Germany - Alerts are inseparable with the tasks of the Stability Council. It makes significant reference to budgetary surveillance to avoid budgetary urgency (warning of a specified budgetary emergency) and to monitoring compliance with EU budgetary discipline requirements (more on tasks on the Council's website). Netherlands - The CPB provides the data for assessment. It does not provide explicit warnings. Portugal - whenever CFB publishes its regular reports. Council does not publish analyses or comments in reaction to particularly events. Romania - in the case of major fiscal measures envisaged by the government. UK - OBR publishes its forecasts at the same time as the Ministry of Finance the main announcement of the policy. The OBR does not give warnings about the "state" of public finances, but presents detailed analyses so that everyone can judge the fiscal position.
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
activities of the councils
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
analysis, assessments and
reports
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
criticism of fiscal policy
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
trends in deficit and debt
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
transparency and
accountability
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
other
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
Source: Author's questionnaire results
|
AT
|
CY
|
DK
|
FR
|
EL
|
LV
|
LT
|
LU
|
HR
|
IE
|
HU
|
MT
|
NL
|
DE
|
PT
|
RO
|
SE
|
UK
|
insufficient staffing of the council
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
|
|
lack of a communication strategy
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
council is not independent
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
government ignores council and media views on the state of fiscal policy
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
media views and public discussions do not contribute
to the better state of public finances
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
low level of democracy in a society, which is why the impact of the
public is weak
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
low level of press freedom, which is why media do not publish critical
views on government's fiscal policy
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
other, please specify
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
|
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
|
●
|
●
|
●
|
Source: Author’s questionnaire results
Other: France - no obstacles. Germany - no obstacles, as the federal budgetary autonomy system does not permit direct control of the budget process, e.g. the process of drafting government budgetary and financial plans by the central instance. The parliaments enacting the budgetary and financial plans are highest instance representing the public. Greece - our office should have a more "executive role" (in the legislative sense). Ireland - insufficient staff of the council is currently not the major issue but could be a limiting factor in the future if demands on the council increase. Latvia - no obstacles. It is necessary to implement a developed communication strategy. Luxembourg - still lacking access to data; "comply or explain" principle could be clarified in the long term through the Memorandum of understanding. Malta - usually media do not properly emphasize the state of public finances, unless there are significant risks of severe deterioration in fiscal position, or serious noncompliance with the EU fiscal rules. Netherlands - no major obstacles. Romania - reputational costs for politicians and government are not contained in legislation. Sweden - we are a small institution (staff of five people) so there are limits to what we can do, but we really enjoy independence and are free to communicate with the public whenever and in whatever way we choose. UK - no obstacles.
Council
|
HR
Commission on Fiscal Policy
|
IE
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC)
|
HU
Fiscal Council
|
NL
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
|
SE
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
|
UK
Office for Budget Responsibility
(OBR)
|
Impact on transparency and accountability in the
budget process
|
Promoting fiscal transparency and accountability,
monitoring fiscal sustainability
|
Promoting fiscal transparency and accountability,
transparency analysis, monitoring fiscal sustainability, preparing public
reports with media impact and promoting sound public policies
|
Monitoring fiscal sustainability and promoting sound
public policies
|
Promoting fiscal transparency and accountability,
monitoring fiscal sustainability, preparation of public reports with media
influence
|
Preparation of public reports that influence media
reporting and promotion of sound public policies
|
Promoting fiscal transparency and accountability and
preparing public reports to influence media reporting
|
Results so far in informing the public and
increasing transparency and accountability
|
Good
|
Good
|
Good
|
Good
|
Good
|
Good
|
Impact of fiscal rules and councils on transparency
and accountability in the budget process
|
Public disclosure of information on compliance with
fiscal rules and communicating analyses, evaluations and reports
|
Through the media
|
Promoting transparency and accountability, and
transparency of work
|
Through the media, the public then affects the
reputation of the politician, publicly disclosing information on compliance
with fiscal rules and communicating analyses, evaluations and reports, and
promoting transparency and accountability
|
Public disclosure of information on compliance with
fiscal rules and communicating analyses, evaluations and reports, and
transparency of work
|
Through the media, the public influences the
reputation of politicians, public disclosure of information on compliance
with fiscal rules and communication of analyses, assessments and reports,
promoting transparency and accountability, and transparency of work
|
Public finance alerts
|
In case of excessive government spending
|
Disagreement on proposed budgets and stated goals,
over-optimistic forecasts, excessive government spending, unsustainable tax
policies, poor fiscal performance, reference to the realities and raising
public awareness of sound finances
|
Disagreement of proposed budgets with stated goals,
over-optimistic forecasts, poorer fiscal performance than projected,
reference to actual situation
|
Provides data for assessing the situation
|
Disagreement on proposed budgets and goals,
over-optimistic forecasts, excessive government spending, and raising public
awareness of sound finances
|
Council presents its view on public finances at the
same time as the Ministry of Finance of the main announcement, does not warn
but presents detailed analysis
|
Public reaction to the media's findings on the
non-transparency and irresponsibility
|
Constant pressure for the sake of transparency and
accountability
|
It is difficult to measure public reaction. From the
media reaction, most media outlets and major economic reporters are catching
on to the main points / criticism of the budget / SGP that are contained in
the reports
|
Public debates and pressure for transparency and
accountability
|
The issue is not relevant to them
|
For the most part, the national fiscal backbone is
working well and for the most part politicians respect it. There is
relatively strong public support for fiscal discipline and therefore the
political cost of financial irresponsibility is potentially high
|
It is not up to OBR to answer this question
|
Source: Autor's questionnaire results
Visits refer to users (not robots) and are expressed cumulatively .
Article visits include visits to the article web page and visits to all full text files regarding this article.
To obtain a more realistic insight into the actual visits and reduce the possibility of manipulation (manually or automated) the following records were filtered out: - detected robot visits
- consecutive access to the same page or full text file from the same IP addres
|
|
September, 2020 III/2020 |