1566
Views
133
Downloads |
Fiscal dominance and inflation: evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa*
Article | Year: 2024 | Pages: 363 - 391 | Volume: 48 | Issue: 48 Received: November 10, 2023 | Accepted: April 23, 2024 | Published online: September 3, 2024
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
Sources: Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD); national authorities; and IMF staff
calculations.
Sources: CBLD; International Financial Statistics (IFS); World Economic Outlook (WEO);
national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Sources: CBLD; national authorities; MFS; WEO; and IMF staff calculations.
|
Variable
|
No. of obs.
|
Mean
|
St. Dev.
|
Min.
|
Max.
|
|
Central bank claims/GDP
|
719
|
6.1
|
8.9
|
0.0
|
63.2
|
|
Percentage change of central bank claims/GDP
|
675
|
5.2
|
22.8
|
-217.5
|
150.7
|
|
Central bank loans/GDP
|
719
|
3.7
|
5.6
|
0.0
|
61.5
|
|
Percentage change of central bank loans/GDP
|
677
|
2.1
|
21.6
|
-260.5
|
162.1
|
|
Fiscal deficit/GDP
|
756
|
2.6
|
5.6
|
-27.2
|
30.4
|
|
Real GDP Growth
|
770
|
4.6
|
5.2
|
-36.7
|
60.1
|
|
Legal Limit/revenue
|
703
|
11.2
|
7.8
|
0.0
|
25.0
|
|
Government deposits/GDP
|
731
|
4.4
|
5.1
|
0.0
|
33.0
|
|
Government gross debt/GDP
|
754
|
62.1
|
49.6
|
0.5
|
406.7
|
|
Dummy for domestic market development (1 or 0)
|
781
|
0.5
|
0.5
|
0.0
|
1.0
|
|
Dummy for IMF conditionality on central bank
lending (1 or 0)
|
781
|
0.2
|
0.4
|
0.0
|
1.0
|
|
Interaction between fiscal deficit and legal
limits (%*%)
|
678
|
15.7
|
88.6
|
-610.1
|
545
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
(5)
|
|
Dependent
variable: Central bank loans/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
Model 4
|
Model 5
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.1041***
|
0.0362
|
0.0409*
|
0.0216
|
0.0267
|
|
(0.0359)
|
(0.0254)
|
(0.0209)
|
(0.0262)
|
(0.0220)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
|
0.0046***
|
0.0053***
|
0.0055***
|
0.0062***
|
|
(0.0015)
|
(0.0014)
|
(0.0019)
|
(0.0018)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market development
|
|
|
-0.0639**
|
|
-0.0622**
|
|
|
(0.0284)
|
|
(0.0260)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × IMF conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.0269*
|
-0.0255**
|
|
|
|
(0.0149)
|
(0.0123)
|
|
Legal
limit
|
|
-0.0014
|
0.0007
|
-0.0036
|
-0.0018
|
|
|
(0.0317)
|
(0.0344)
|
(0.0318)
|
(0.0343)
|
|
Domestic
market development
|
|
|
-0.9234**
|
|
-0.8080**
|
|
|
|
(0.4267)
|
|
(0.3835)
|
|
IMF
conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.7964
|
-0.6888
|
|
|
|
|
(0.5420)
|
(0.5166)
|
|
Lags
of central bank loans/GDP
|
0.8049***
|
0.7952***
|
0.7992***
|
0.7904***
|
0.7952***
|
|
(0.0461)
|
(0.0381)
|
(0.0402)
|
(0.0354)
|
(0.0368)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.0163
|
-0.0223**
|
-0.0210**
|
-0.0221**
|
-0.0209**
|
|
(0.0115)
|
(0.0108)
|
(0.0098)
|
(0.0112)
|
(0.0100)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-0.0737
|
-0.0811
|
-0.0952
|
-0.0735
|
-0.0873
|
|
(0.0739)
|
(0.0606)
|
(0.0640)
|
(0.0598)
|
(0.0630)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0100*
|
-0.0035
|
-0.0026
|
-0.0073
|
-0.0062
|
|
(0.0057)
|
(0.0067)
|
(0.0070)
|
(0.0068)
|
(0.0068)
|
|
Observations
|
667
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
|
Number
of countries
|
45
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
|
Variable
|
No. of obs.
|
Mean
|
St. Dev.
|
Min.
|
Max.
|
|
Base money
|
729
|
11.0
|
7.4
|
0.1
|
52.8
|
|
Exchange
rate
|
780
|
4.6
|
16.6
|
-28.1
|
295.5
|
|
Inflation
|
764
|
8.2
|
18.0
|
-72.7
|
357.3
|
|
Broad money
|
764
|
32.4
|
24.2
|
3.1
|
150.8
|
Sources: WEO; IFS; and IMF staff calculations.
Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions for a one unit innovation in the ratio of
central bank loans to GDP and presents both the point estimates and the 68 and 90 percent confidence
intervals around them.
|
Country name
|
Legal limit
|
Name of most recent legislation
|
Year current legislation took effect (last amendment)
|
|
Angola
|
10% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Banco Nacional de Angola
Act. Law No. 16/10 15 July
|
2010
|
|
Benin
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Botswana
|
5% of previous three years’
average revenue
|
The Bank of Botswana Act.
1996
|
1997
|
|
Burkina Faso
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Burundi
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Cabo Verde
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Organic Law of the Bank of
Cape Verde, 2002
|
2002
|
|
Cameroon
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Central African Republic
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Chad
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Comoros
|
20% of previous three years’
average revenue
|
Statuts de la Banque
Centrale des Comoros, 2008
|
2008
|
|
Congo, Democratic Rep. of
|
0%
|
Law 005/2002 on the Establishment,
Organization, and Operations of the Central Bank of Congo, May 7, 2002
|
2002
|
|
Congo, Republic of
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Equatorial Guinea
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Eritrea
|
N/A
|
|
|
|
Ethiopia
|
N/S
|
Monetary and Banking
Proclamation No. 183/1994 and No. 591/2008
|
1994 (2008)
|
|
Gabon
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Bank of
Central African States, 2010 (CEMAC)
|
2010
|
|
Gambia, The
|
10% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Central Bank of Gambia Act, 2005
|
2005
|
|
Ghana
|
5% of current year’s revenue
|
Bank of Ghana Act, 24th
January 2002
|
2002 (2016)
|
|
Guinea
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Charter of the Central Bank
of the Republic of Guinea, 1994
|
1994 (2017)
|
|
Guinea-Bissau
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Kenya
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
The Central Bank of Kenya
Act
|
1966 (2014)
|
|
Lesotho
|
Net claim is 5% of previous
year’s budget
|
Central Bank of Lesotho Act,
2000
|
2000
|
|
Madagascar
|
7% of previous year’s revenue
|
Charter of the Central Bank of Madagascar,
1994
|
1994 (2016)
|
|
Malawi
|
20% of current year’s revenue
|
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act - Laws of Malawi
(Chapter 44:02), 1989
|
1989
|
|
Mali
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Mauritania
|
5% of previous year’s revenue
|
Charter of the Central Bank of Mauritania
|
2007
|
|
Mauritius
|
10% of current year’s revenue
|
The Bank of Mauritius Act, 2004
|
2004 (2015)
|
|
Mozambique
|
10% of previous year’s revenue
|
Law 1/92 of January 3, 1992
|
1992
|
|
Namibia
|
25% of previous three years’ average revenue
|
Bank of Namibia Act, 1997
|
1997
|
|
Niger
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Nigeria
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Central Bank of Nigeria Act,
2007
|
2007
|
|
Rwanda
|
11% of previous year’s government
revenue
|
Law No. 55/2007 of 30/11/2007 Governing the
Central Bank of Rwanda
|
2007
|
|
São Tomé and Príncipe
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Law 8/92, Organic Law of the
Central Bank of STP, 1992
|
1992
|
|
Senegal
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African Monetary
Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Seychelles
|
N/S
|
Central Bank of Seychelles
Act, 2004
|
2004 (2011)
|
|
Sierra Leone
|
5% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Bank of Sierra Leone Act,
2000
|
2000
|
|
South Africa
|
N/S
|
South African Reserve Bank
Act 90, 1989
|
1989
|
|
Sudan
|
15% of current year’s
revenue
|
The Bank of Sudan Act, 2002
|
2002
|
|
Swaziland (Eswatini)
|
20% of previous three years’
average revenue
|
The Central Bank of
Swaziland Order, 1974
|
1974 (1979)
|
|
Tanzania
|
12.5 % of previous year’s
revenue
|
The Bank of Tanzania Act,
2006
|
2006 (2010)
|
|
Togo
|
0%
|
Treaty of the West African
Monetary Union (UEMOA)
|
N/S
|
|
Uganda
|
18% of previous year’s
revenue
|
The Bank of Uganda Statute,
1993
|
1993 (2010)
|
|
Zambia
|
15% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Bank of Zambia (Amendment)
Act, 1998
|
1998
|
|
Zimbabwe
|
20% of previous year’s
revenue
|
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act
(Chapter 22:15)
|
2010
|
Sources: National Authorities; and Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD).
|
Dependent variable: Central bank loans/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
Model 4
|
Model 5
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.0156
|
-0.0329
|
-0.0172
|
-0.0077
|
-0.0010
|
|
(0.0416)
|
(0.0415)
|
(0.0312)
|
(0.0243)
|
(0.0207)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
|
0.0066**
|
0.0053**
|
0.0056***
|
0.0053**
|
|
(0.0028)
|
(0.0025)
|
(0.0021)
|
(0.0021)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market development
|
|
|
0.0202
|
|
-0.0148
|
|
|
(0.0555)
|
|
(0.0427)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × IMF conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.0252**
|
-0.0239**
|
|
|
|
(0.0119)
|
(0.0107)
|
|
Legal
limit
|
|
0.0098
|
0.0122
|
0.0139
|
0.0043
|
|
(0.0185)
|
(0.0152)
|
(0.0226)
|
(0.0210)
|
|
Domestic
market development
|
|
|
-0.8749***
|
|
-0.7560***
|
|
|
(0.2580)
|
|
(0.2244)
|
|
IMF
conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.5713
|
-0.5919
|
|
|
|
(0.4638)
|
(0.4116)
|
|
Lags
of central bank loans/GDP
|
0.7584***
|
0.7355***
|
0.7319***
|
0.7243***
|
0.7237***
|
|
(0.0264)
|
(0.0315)
|
(0.0311)
|
(0.0269)
|
(0.0275)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.0143
|
-0.0130
|
-0.0146*
|
-0.0163
|
-0.0166*
|
|
(0.0106)
|
(0.0100)
|
(0.0087)
|
(0.0102)
|
(0.0093)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-0.0248
|
-0.0328
|
-0.0356
|
-0.0265
|
-0.0264
|
|
(0.0443)
|
(0.0341)
|
(0.0314)
|
(0.0270)
|
(0.0270)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0022
|
0.0057**
|
0.0059**
|
0.0051**
|
0.0042**
|
|
0.0156
|
-0.0329
|
-0.0172
|
-0.0077
|
-0.0010
|
|
Observations
|
667
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
|
Number
of countries
|
45
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
|
Dependent variable: Central bank claims/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
Model 4
|
Model 5
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.1449***
|
0.0375*
|
0.0398*
|
0.0274
|
0.0298
|
|
(0.0460)
|
(0.0228)
|
(0.0210)
|
(0.0245)
|
(0.0230)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
|
0.0037**
|
0.0038**
|
0.0044**
|
0.0046**
|
|
(0.0015)
|
(0.0016)
|
(0.0020)
|
(0.0020)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market development
|
|
|
-0.0184
|
|
-0.0187
|
|
|
(0.0373)
|
|
(0.0355)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × IMF conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.0183
|
-0.0181
|
|
|
|
(0.0153)
|
(0.0135)
|
|
Legal
limit (measured in percent of revenue)
|
|
0.0339
|
0.0384
|
0.0320
|
0.0359
|
|
(0.0382)
|
(0.0390)
|
(0.0404)
|
(0.0410)
|
|
Domestic
market development
|
|
|
-0.6718
|
|
-0.5889
|
|
|
(0.4664)
|
|
(0.4591)
|
|
IMF
conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.6187
|
-0.5315
|
|
|
|
(0.6402)
|
(0.6146)
|
|
Lags
of central bank claims/GDP
|
0.8974***
|
0.8269***
|
0.8272***
|
0.8240***
|
0.8251***
|
|
(0.0752)
|
(0.0360)
|
(0.0374)
|
(0.0335)
|
(0.0348)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.0270
|
-0.0254
|
-0.0235
|
-0.0270
|
-0.0252
|
|
(0.0174)
|
(0.0206)
|
(0.0192)
|
(0.0211)
|
(0.0195)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-0.0839
|
-0.0733
|
-0.0786
|
-0.0704
|
-0.0756
|
|
(0.0768)
|
(0.0626)
|
(0.0634)
|
(0.0643)
|
(0.0652)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0148**
|
-0.0105
|
-0.0103
|
-0.0129*
|
-0.0125
|
|
(0.0068)
|
(0.0078)
|
(0.0080)
|
(0.0077)
|
(0.0078)
|
|
Observations
|
667
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
|
Number
of countries
|
45
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
|
Dependent variable: Change in Central bank
loans/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
Model 4
|
Model 5
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.6263**
|
0.0935
|
0.1016
|
-0.0331
|
-0.0253
|
|
(0.3038)
|
(0.2369)
|
(0.2366)
|
(0.2522)
|
(0.2538)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
|
0.0415***
|
0.0441***
|
0.0540***
|
0.0565***
|
|
(0.0159)
|
(0.0157)
|
(0.0205)
|
(0.0200)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market development
|
|
|
-0.1821
|
|
-0.1929
|
|
|
(0.3505)
|
|
(0.3321)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × IMF conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.2427*
|
-0.2372**
|
|
|
|
(0.1256)
|
(0.1150)
|
|
Legal
limit
|
|
0.6758
|
0.6126
|
0.5591
|
0.4772
|
|
(0.5628)
|
(0.5009)
|
(0.4962)
|
(0.4424)
|
|
Domestic
market development
|
|
|
3.9462
|
|
4.9117
|
|
|
(5.6728)
|
|
(4.9638)
|
|
IMF
conditionality
|
|
|
|
-8.8235
|
-9.2823
|
|
|
|
(6.8652)
|
(6.9630)
|
|
Lags
of change in central bank loans/GDP
|
-0.1952**
|
0.0203
|
0.0146
|
0.0052
|
-0.0022
|
|
(0.0942)
|
(0.0628)
|
(0.0677)
|
(0.0632)
|
(0.0689)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.1873
|
-0.2062
|
-0.1960
|
-0.2132
|
-0.2001
|
|
(0.1644)
|
(0.2083)
|
(0.2150)
|
(0.2213)
|
(0.2274)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-1.1335*
|
-0.8138*
|
-0.7709*
|
-0.7390
|
-0.6889
|
|
(0.6185)
|
(0.4752)
|
(0.4557)
|
(0.4700)
|
(0.4486)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0873*
|
-0.0132
|
-0.0059
|
-0.0373
|
-0.0280
|
|
(0.0468)
|
(0.0818)
|
(0.0852)
|
(0.0753)
|
(0.0771)
|
|
Observations
|
629
|
561
|
561
|
561
|
561
|
|
Number
of countries
|
45
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
|
Dependent variable: Central bank loans/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.0370
|
0.0734*
|
0.0752*
|
|
(0.0253)
|
(0.0394)
|
(0.0400)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
0.0046***
|
0.0056**
|
0.0056**
|
|
(0.0015)
|
(0.0022)
|
(0.0022)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market dvpt+Eurobond access
|
-0.0358
|
|
-0.0887
|
|
(0.0778)
|
|
(0.1133)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Sovereign risk
|
|
-0.0054
|
-0.0054
|
|
(0.0042)
|
(0.0042)
|
|
Legal
limit
|
-0.0013
|
-0.0181
|
-0.0172
|
|
(0.0321)
|
(0.0470)
|
(0.0474)
|
|
Domestic
market dvpt+ Eurobond access
|
0.1744
|
|
0.6700
|
|
(0.6399)
|
|
(0.8910)
|
|
Sovereign
risk
|
|
-0.0541
|
-0.0576
|
|
(0.1557)
|
(0.1515)
|
|
Lags
of central bank loans/GDP
|
0.7947***
|
0.7908***
|
0.7887***
|
|
(0.0382)
|
(0.0533)
|
(0.0533)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.0221**
|
-0.0207
|
-0.0204
|
|
(0.0108)
|
(0.0145)
|
(0.0147)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-0.0805
|
-0.1272
|
-0.1242
|
|
(0.0605)
|
(0.0888)
|
(0.0885)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0034
|
-0.0023
|
-0.0023
|
|
(0.0066)
|
(0.0068)
|
(0.0066)
|
|
Observations
|
596
|
443
|
443
|
|
Number
of countries
|
41
|
35
|
35
|
Notes: Sovereign risk measures the risk of debt distress using the ratings from the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (=0 if the rating is “Low”; =1 if the rating is
“Moderate”=2 if the rating is “High”=3 if the rating is “In debt distress”). Eurobond access is a dummy (=1 if the country has previously issued a Eurobond, 0 otherwise).
|
Dependent variable: Central bank loans/GDP
|
Model 1
|
Model 2
|
Model 3
|
Model 4
|
Model 5
|
|
Fiscal deficit
|
0.0833***
|
0.0050
|
0.0085
|
-0.0007
|
0.0031
|
|
(0.0173)
|
(0.0210)
|
(0.0211)
|
(0.0208)
|
(0.0208)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Legal limit
|
|
0.0037***
|
0.0040***
|
0.0047***
|
0.0050***
|
|
(0.0012)
|
(0.0013)
|
(0.0013)
|
(0.0013)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × Domestic market development
|
|
|
-0.0464*
|
|
-0.0469*
|
|
|
(0.0243)
|
|
(0.0242)
|
|
Fiscal deficit × IMF conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.0336***
|
-0.0314**
|
|
|
|
(0.0126)
|
(0.0127)
|
|
Legal
limit
|
|
-0.0149
|
-0.0166
|
-0.0179
|
-0.0192
|
|
(0.0264)
|
(0.0265)
|
(0.0262)
|
(0.0263)
|
|
Domestic
market development
|
|
|
0.0921
|
|
0.1098
|
|
|
(0.2347)
|
|
(0.2330)
|
|
IMF
conditionality
|
|
|
|
-0.1878
|
-0.2600
|
|
|
|
(0.1926)
|
(0.1933)
|
|
Lags
of central bank loans/GDP
|
0.7609***
|
0.7748***
|
0.7716***
|
0.7741***
|
0.7707***
|
|
(0.0233)
|
(0.0173)
|
(0.0176)
|
(0.0172)
|
(0.0175)
|
|
Lag
of real GDP growth
|
-0.0250
|
-0.0217*
|
-0.0195
|
-0.0209*
|
-0.0187
|
|
(0.0157)
|
(0.0123)
|
(0.0123)
|
(0.0122)
|
(0.0122)
|
|
Lag
of government deposit/GDP
|
-0.0218
|
-0.0397*
|
-0.0381*
|
-0.0389*
|
-0.0370*
|
|
(0.0231)
|
(0.0206)
|
(0.0209)
|
(0.0205)
|
(0.0207)
|
|
Lag
of government debt/GDP
|
-0.0010
|
-0.0018
|
-0.0014
|
-0.0036*
|
-0.0032
|
|
(0.0027)
|
(0.0021)
|
(0.0021)
|
(0.0021)
|
(0.0022)
|
|
Observations
|
667
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
596
|
|
Number
of countries
|
45
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
41
|
|
Dependent variable
|
Horizon
|
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
|
Base Money
|
580
|
545
|
507
|
469
|
430
|
391
|
354
|
|
(40)
|
(40)
|
(40)
|
(40)
|
(40)
|
(38)
|
(37)
|
|
Exchange Rate
|
596
|
560
|
521
|
482
|
442
|
402
|
364
|
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(39)
|
(38)
|
|
Inflation
|
596
|
560
|
521
|
482
|
442
|
402
|
364
|
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(39)
|
(38)
|
|
Broad Money
|
596
|
560
|
521
|
482
|
442
|
402
|
364
|
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(41)
|
(39)
|
(38)
|
|
Angola
|
Madagascar
|
|
Benin
|
Malawi
|
|
Botswana
|
Mali
|
|
Burkina Faso
|
Mauritania
|
|
Burundi
|
Mauritius
|
|
Cabo Verde
|
Mozambique
|
|
Cameroon
|
Namibia
|
|
Central African Republic
|
Niger
|
|
Chad
|
Nigeria
|
|
Comoros
|
Rwanda
|
|
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
|
São Tomé and Principe
|
|
Congo, Rep.
|
Senegal
|
|
Côte d'Ivoire
|
Seychelles
|
|
Equatorial Guinea
|
Sierra Leone
|
|
Eritrea
|
South Africa
|
|
Ethiopia
|
Sudan
|
|
Gabon
|
Swaziland
|
|
Gambia
|
Tanzania
|
|
Ghana
|
Togo
|
|
Guinea
|
Uganda
|
|
Guinea-Bissau
|
Zambia
|
|
Kenya
|
Zimbabwe
|
|
Lesotho
|
|
Alesina, A. and Summers, L. H., 1993. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(2), pp. 151-162 [ CrossRef]
Alpanda, S. and Honig, A., 2009. The impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(7), pp. 1365-1389 [ CrossRef]
Arellano, M. and Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), pp. 29-51 [ CrossRef]
Blundell, R. and Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), pp. 115-143 [ CrossRef]
Bordo, M. D. and Siklos. P. L., 2018. Central Banks: Evolution and Innovation in Historical Perspective. In: R. Edvinsson, T. Jacobson and D. Waldenström (eds.). Sveriges Riksbank and the History of Central Banking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [ CrossRef]
Bruno, G. S., 2005. Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic unbalanced panel data models. Economics letters, 87(3), pp. 361-366 [ CrossRef]
Cagan, P., 1956. The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation. In: M. Friedman, ed. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cottarelli, C., 1993. Limiting central bank credit to the government: theory and practice. In: Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government. Washington: International Monetary Fund [ CrossRef]
Fischer, S., 1995. Central-bank independence revisited. The American Economic Review, 85(2), pp. 201-206.
Galí, J., 2020. The effects of a money-financed fiscal stimulus. Journal of Monetary Economics, 115, pp. 1-19 [ CrossRef]
Garriga, A. C. and Rodriguez, C. M., 2020. More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries. Economic Modelling, 85, pp. 87-105 [ CrossRef]
Hanke, S. H. and Krus, N., 2013. World hyperinflations. In: R. Parker and R. Whaples, eds. Routledge handbook of major events in economic history, pp. 367-377.
IMF, 2014. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regional Economic Outlook, April. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 2018. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regional Economic Outlook, October. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
IMF, 2020. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regional Economic Outlook, April. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Jácome, L. I. [et al.], 2012. Central Bank Credit to the Government: What Can We Learn from International Practices? IMF Working Paper, No. 12/16 [ CrossRef]
Jordà, Ò., 2005. Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections. American Economic Review, 95(1), pp. 161-182 [ CrossRef]
Sikken, B. J. and Haan, J. D., 1998. Budget deficits, monetization, and centralbank independence in developing countries. Oxford Economic Papers, 50(3), pp. 493-511 [ CrossRef]
Sargent, T. J. and Wallace, N., 1981. Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5(3), pp. 1-17 [ CrossRef]
Sims, C. A., 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp.1-48 [ CrossRef]
Yashiv, E. 2020. Breaking the taboo: The political economy of COVID-motivated helicopter drops. VoxEU.org, 26 March 2020.
|
|
September, 2024
III/2024
|
