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History matters: development and institutional persistence of the Habsburg Military Frontier in Croatia*
Marina Tkalec* 
Marina Tkalec
Affiliation: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Department of Macroeconomics and International Economics, Zagreb, Croatia
 0000-0001-7974-9345
Correspondence
mtkalec@eizg.hr
Article | Year: 2020 | Pages: 117 - 145 | Volume: 44 | Issue: 1 Received: June 1, 2019 | Accepted: October 14, 2019 | Published online: March 3, 2020
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
Source: The World of the Habsburgs (1800).
Notes: Military Frontier in modern-day Croatia before its dissolution in 1881. We are grateful to Tomislav Kaniški from Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža who provided us with Military Frontier 1868–1881 shapefiles from Regan and Kaniški (2003). LiTS wave 2006 is presented by the red color, the 2010 wave with yellow, and the 2016 wave with the blue color.
|
|
Both sides
|
Military Frontier
|
Non-Military Frontier
|
|
|
|
|
Mean
|
SD
|
Min
|
Max
|
Mean
|
SD
|
Mean
|
SD
|
|
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
(5)
|
(6)
|
(7)
|
(8)
|
|
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
0.139
|
0.346
|
0
|
1
|
1.000
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
|
|
|
Individual-level variables
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Age of respondent
|
50.299
|
17.613
|
18
|
95
|
52.420
|
17.534
|
49.957
|
17.605
|
|
|
|
Male respondent
|
0.587
|
0.492
|
0
|
1
|
0.619
|
0.486
|
0.582
|
0.493
|
|
|
|
Worked for income during last 12 months
|
0.479
|
0.500
|
0
|
1
|
0.360
|
0.481
|
0.498
|
0.500
|
|
|
|
Education (omitted category: no degree)
|
|
|
|
Compulsory schooling education
|
0.147
|
0.355
|
0
|
1
|
0.195
|
0.396
|
0.140
|
0.347
|
|
|
|
Secondary education
|
0.456
|
0.498
|
0
|
1
|
0.410
|
0.492
|
0.464
|
0.499
|
|
|
|
Professional, vocational school or training
|
0.170
|
0.375
|
0
|
1
|
0.159
|
0.366
|
0.171
|
0.377
|
|
|
|
Higher professional degree
(university, college)
|
0.136
|
0.343
|
0
|
1
|
0.083
|
0.276
|
0.145
|
0.352
|
|
|
|
Post-graduate degree
|
0.026
|
0.159
|
0
|
1
|
0.021
|
0.143
|
0.027
|
0.161
|
|
|
|
Religion (omitted category: atheist)
|
|
|
|
|
Buddhist
|
0.001
|
0.024
|
0
|
1
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.001
|
0.026
|
|
|
|
Jewish
|
0.001
|
0.024
|
0
|
1
|
0.000
|
0.000
|
0.001
|
0.026
|
|
|
|
Christian
|
0.900
|
0.300
|
0
|
1
|
0.928
|
0.260
|
0.895
|
0.306
|
|
|
|
Muslim
|
0.012
|
0.109
|
0
|
1
|
0.031
|
0.174
|
0.009
|
0.095
|
|
|
|
Other
|
0.007
|
0.085
|
0
|
1
|
0.004
|
0.064
|
0.008
|
0.087
|
|
|
|
Household-level variables
|
|
|
|
|
Household has a car
|
0.713
|
0.452
|
0
|
1
|
0.609
|
0.489
|
0.730
|
0.444
|
|
|
|
Household has a bank account
|
0.713
|
0.452
|
0
|
1
|
0.654
|
0.476
|
0.723
|
0.448
|
|
|
|
Household has a credit/debit card
|
0.750
|
0.433
|
0
|
1
|
0.587
|
0.493
|
0.782
|
0.413
|
|
|
|
Household has a mobile phone
|
0.856
|
0.351
|
0
|
1
|
0.739
|
0.440
|
0.875
|
0.330
|
|
|
|
Household has a computer
|
0.584
|
0.493
|
0
|
1
|
0.437
|
0.497
|
0.608
|
0.488
|
|
|
|
Household has access to internet at home
|
0.558
|
0.497
|
0
|
1
|
0.420
|
0.494
|
0.581
|
0.494
|
|
|
|
Household size (equivalent scale)
|
1.755
|
0.624
|
1.000
|
4.500
|
1.774
|
0.656
|
1.752
|
0.619
|
|
|
|
Household number of children under 14
|
1.353
|
0.757
|
1
|
7
|
1.416
|
0.809
|
1.343
|
0.748
|
|
|
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Part of Military
|
0.392**
|
0.273**
|
0.835***
|
0.469*
|
|
Frontier
|
(0.189)
|
(0.137)
|
(0.259)
|
(0.258)
|
|
Age of respondent
|
-0.001
|
0.010***
|
-0.008**
|
-0.018***
|
|
|
(0.002)
|
(0.002)
|
(0.003)
|
(0.003)
|
|
Male respondent
|
-0.120*
|
0.075
|
0.090
|
0.131
|
|
|
(0.064)
|
(0.061)
|
(0.099)
|
(0.094)
|
|
Used service in
|
|
|
0.547***
|
0.644***
|
|
last 12 months
|
|
|
(0.165)
|
(0.123)
|
|
Controls for religious affiliation (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Controls for LiTS wave
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,361
|
3,411
|
3,272
|
3,302
|
|
No. of locations
|
164
|
164
|
164
|
164
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.016
|
0.019
|
0.029
|
0.046
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
0.383**
(0.188)
|
0.285**
(0.139)
|
0.813***
(0.261)
|
0.448*
(0.260)
|
|
Age of respondent
|
-0.001
(0.002)
|
0.010***
(0.002)
|
-0.007**
(0.003)
|
-0.018***
(0.003)
|
|
Male respondent
|
-0.119*
(0.066)
|
0.068
(0.063)
|
0.084
(0.010)
|
0.118
(0.094)
|
|
Used service in last 12 months
|
|
|
0.599***
(0.167)
|
0.652***
(0.124)
|
|
Controls for religious affiliation (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Controls for LiTS wave
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,272
|
3,319
|
3,183
|
3,213
|
|
No. of locations
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.016
|
0.018
|
0.029
|
0.047
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Border sample: respondents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Polynomials
in latitude and longitude
|
|
|
|
|
Linear polynomial
(reference specification)
|
0.329*
(0.192)
|
0.267*
(0.147)
|
0.869***
(0.270)
|
0.450*
(0.253)
|
|
Quadratic polynomial
in latitude and longitude
|
0.225
(0.232)
|
-0.076
(0.191)
|
0.902**
(0.445)
|
0.402
(0.341)
|
|
Cubic polynomial
in latitude and longitude
|
0.214
(0.243)
|
-0.077
(0.199)
|
0.825*
(0.485)
|
0.287
(0.332)
|
|
Quartic polynomial
in latitude and longitude
|
0.275
(0.311)
|
-0.210
(0.249)
|
0.697
(0.715)
|
0.356
(0.469)
|
|
Polynomials in
distance to border
|
|
|
|
|
Linear polynomial
in distance to border
|
0.352
(0.244)
|
0.055
(0.184)
|
0.781**
(0.371)
|
0.460*
(0.301)
|
|
Quadratic polynomial
in distance to border
|
-0.006
(0.052)
|
-0.196**
(0.083)
|
0.773**
(0.372)
|
0.458***
(0.146)
|
|
Interacted linear
polynomial
in distance to border
|
0.241
(0.285)
|
-0.021
(0.206)
|
0.929**
(0.395)
|
0.711**
(0.295)
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,272
|
3,319
|
3,183
|
3,213
|
Notes: All reported estimates are coefficients of the variable “Part of Military Frontier” in a model specification that includes all control variables shown in Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Border sample: respondents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border, based on GIS-computed distance from border. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
No. of
|
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
observations
|
clusters
|
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
(5)
|
(6)
|
|
|
Border
specification (as in Table 3) (distance from border in km)
|
|
|
<200
|
0.383**
(0.188)
|
0.285**
(0.139)
|
0.813***
(0.261)
|
0.448*
(0.260)
|
3,272
|
159
|
|
|
<150
|
0.403**
(0.188)
|
0.289**
(0.139)
|
0.830***
(0.263)
|
0.469*
(0.261)
|
3,232
|
157
|
|
|
|
|
<100
|
0.367*
(0.188)
|
0.268*
(0.141)
|
0.825***
(0.264)
|
0.449*
(0.265)
|
3,054
|
148
|
|
|
|
|
<50
|
0.401**
(0.195)
|
0.213
(0.150)
|
0.850***
(0.279)
|
0.451*
(0.268)
|
2,178
|
105
|
|
|
|
|
<25
|
0.131
(0.243)
|
0.117
(0.183)
|
0.735*
(0.394)
|
0.527
(0.329)
|
967
|
51
|
|
|
|
|
RDD specification with
linear polynomial in latitude and longitude (as in Table 4) (distance from
border in km)
|
|
|
|
|
<200
|
0.329*
(0.192)
|
0.267*
(0.146)
|
0.869***
(0.270)
|
0.450*
(0.253)
|
3,272
|
159
|
|
|
|
|
<150
|
0.356*
(0.192)
|
0.282*
(0.147)
|
0.895***
(0.271)
|
0.484*
(0.253)
|
3,232
|
157
|
|
|
|
|
<100
|
0.300
(0.192)
|
0.257*
(0.150)
|
0.853***
(0.276)
|
0.447*
(0.258)
|
3,054
|
148
|
|
|
|
|
<50
|
0.227
(0.196)
|
0.264
(0.175)
|
0.813***
(0.309)
|
0.482*
(0.261)
|
2,178
|
105
|
|
|
|
|
<25
|
0.004
(0.232)
|
0.015
(0.185)
|
0.839*
(0.456)
|
0.605
(0.371)
|
967
|
51
|
|
|
|
Notes: All reported estimates are coefficients of the variable “Part of Military Frontier” in a model specification that includes all control variables shown in Table 3. The number of observations and clusters reported in columns (5) and (6) refer to the average number of observations/ clusters in all four model specifications. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Border specification
|
|
|
|
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
0.324*
|
0.229*
|
0.825***
|
0.476*
|
|
(0.185)
|
(0.137)
|
(0.265)
|
(0.260)
|
|
Age of respondent
|
-0.004
|
0.006**
|
-0.004
|
-0.014***
|
|
(0.002)
|
(0.003)
|
(0.004)
|
(0.125)
|
|
Male respondent
|
-0.094
|
0.045
|
0.024
|
0.046
|
|
(0.064)
|
(0.065)
|
(0.104)
|
(0.094)
|
|
Used service in last 12 months
|
|
|
0.589***
|
0.587***
|
|
|
|
(0.171)
|
(0.125)
|
|
Worked for income during last 12 months
|
-0.048
|
-0.179**
|
0.198*
|
0.216*
|
|
(0.077)
|
(0.085)
|
(0.101)
|
(0.095)
|
|
Urban area
|
0.089
|
-0.043
|
0.110
|
-0.004
|
|
(0.121)
|
(0.112)
|
(0.225)
|
(0.194)
|
|
Household size(equivalent scale)
|
0.036
|
0.173**
|
0.195*
|
0.094
|
|
(0.079)
|
(0.077)
|
(0.114)
|
(0.101)
|
|
Household number of children under 14
|
0.116**
|
0.059
|
-0.097
|
-0.038
|
|
(0.055)
|
(0.052)
|
(0.074)
|
(0.073)
|
|
Controls for religious affiliation (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Controls for LiTS wave
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Controls for household property (4 variables)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
Controls for education level (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,272
|
3,319
|
3,183
|
3,213
|
|
No. of locations
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.020
|
0.022
|
0.033
|
0.051
|
|
RDD specification with linear polynomial in latitude and longitude
|
|
Part of Military
|
0.280
|
0.220
|
0.880***
|
0.474*
|
|
Frontier
|
(0.188)
|
(0.143)
|
(0.274)
|
(0.254)
|
|
Controls (as above)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: respondents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border, based on GIS-computed distance from border. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Membership in
|
|
|
other people
|
trade unions
|
political parties
|
civic organizations
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Border specification
|
|
|
|
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
-0.329*
|
-0.141
|
0.016
|
0.103**
|
|
(0.185)
|
(0.195)
|
(0.105)
|
(0.149)
|
|
Controls (as in Table 6)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,243
|
3,196
|
3,370
|
3,370
|
|
No. of locations
|
158
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.013
|
0.008
|
0.052
|
0.116
|
|
RDD specification with
linear polynomial in latitude and longitude
|
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
-0.299
|
-0.126
|
0.010
|
0.105**
|
|
(0.190)
|
(0.198)
|
(0.105)
|
(0.152)
|
|
Controls (as in Table 6)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,243
|
3,196
|
3,370
|
3,370
|
|
No. of locations
|
158
|
159
|
159
|
159
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.015
|
0.009
|
0.059
|
0.118
|
Notes: Columns (1) and (2): Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Columns (3) and (4): marginal effects and standard errors from probit estimations. Sample: respondents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border, based on GIScomputed distance from border. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following [...]?” Column (1): Other people. Column (2): Trade unions. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) is answer to the question “Are you a member of a political party?”. Dependent variable in columns (4) is answer to the question “Are you a member of (other) civic/voluntary organizations?”. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
0.325
|
0.153
|
0.804**
|
0.567
|
|
(0.230)
|
(0.139)
|
(0.344)
|
(0.348)
|
|
Age of respondent
|
-0.002
|
0.010***
|
-0.009***
|
-0.019***
|
|
(0.002)
|
(0.002)
|
(0.003)
|
(0.003)
|
|
Male respondent
|
-0.127*
|
0.064
|
0.051
|
0.123
|
|
(0.068)
|
(0.067)
|
(0.106)
|
(0.100)
|
|
Used service in last 12 months
|
|
|
0.509***
|
0.637***
|
|
|
|
(0.178)
|
(0.130)
|
|
Controls for religious affiliation (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Controls for LiTS wave
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,036
|
3,080
|
2,957
|
2,994
|
|
No. of locations
|
147
|
147
|
147
|
147
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.016
|
0.020
|
0.023
|
0.043
|
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: areas behind the frontline at arrival of UN forces in 1992 are excluded. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/ Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016 and Šterc and Pokos (1993); see main text for details.
|
|
Trust in
|
Bribes to
|
|
|
courts
|
police
|
courts
|
traffic police
|
|
|
(1)
|
(2)
|
(3)
|
(4)
|
|
Part of Military Frontier
|
0.288
|
0.141
|
0.821**
|
0.577*
|
|
(0.231)
|
(0.142)
|
(0.340)
|
(0.343)
|
|
Age of respondent
|
-0.001
|
0.009***
|
-0.009***
|
-0.018***
|
|
(0.002)
|
(0.002)
|
(0.003)
|
(0.003)
|
|
Male respondent
|
-0.129*
|
0.067
|
0.045
|
0.124
|
|
(0.067)
|
(0.064)
|
(0.103)
|
(0.095)
|
|
Used service in last 12 months
|
|
|
0.513***
|
0.615***
|
|
|
|
(0.173)
|
(0.126)
|
|
Controls for religious affiliation (6 categories)
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Controls for LiTS wave
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
|
No. of observations
|
3,184
|
3,230
|
3,106
|
3,143
|
|
No. of locations
|
155
|
155
|
155
|
155
|
|
Pseudo-R2
|
0.015
|
0.018
|
0.026
|
0.044
|
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: areas behind the frontline at arrival of UN forces in 1992 on the territory of former Military Frontier are excluded. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/ gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016 and Šterc and Pokos (1993); see main text for details.
---, 1829. Versuch einer Darstellung der oesterreichischen Monarchie in statistischen Tafeln. Oesterreichische Monarchie
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March, 2020
I/2020
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