5397 Views
1186 Downloads |
On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums
Pavel A. Yakovlev*
Christina M. Orr-Magulick*
Christina M. Orr-Magulick
Affiliation: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Pittsburgh, USA
0000-0001-8420-0648
Article | Year: 2018 | Pages: 45 - 65 | Volume: 42 | Issue: 1 Received: May 22, 2017 | Accepted: November 15, 2017 | Published online: March 8, 2018
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
State
|
Per
Person Liability
|
Per
Accident Liability
|
Property
Liability
|
State
|
Per
Person Liability
|
Per
Accident Liability
|
Property
Liability
|
Alabama
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
Montana
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Alaska
|
50
|
100
|
25
|
Nebraska
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Arizona
|
15
|
30
|
10
|
Nevada
|
15
|
30
|
10
|
Arkansas*
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
New
Hampshire
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
California
|
15
|
30
|
5
|
New
Jersey
|
15
|
30
|
5
|
Colorado
|
25
|
50
|
15
|
New
Mexico
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Connecticut
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
New
York*
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Delaware*
|
15
|
30
|
10
|
North
Carolina
|
30
|
60
|
25
|
Florida
|
10
|
20
|
10
|
North
Dakota
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Georgia*
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Ohio
|
13
|
25
|
8
|
Hawaii
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
Oklahoma*
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Idaho
|
20
|
50
|
15
|
Oregon
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Illinois
|
20
|
40
|
15
|
Pennsylvania
|
15
|
30
|
5
|
Indiana
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Rhode
Island
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Iowa
|
20
|
40
|
15
|
South
Carolina*
|
15
|
30
|
10
|
Kansas
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
South
Dakota
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Kentucky
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Tennessee
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Louisiana
|
10
|
20
|
10
|
Texas
|
20
|
40
|
15
|
Maine
|
50
|
100
|
25
|
Utah*
|
25
|
50
|
15
|
Maryland
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
Vermont
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Massachusetts*
|
20
|
40
|
5
|
Virginia
|
25
|
50
|
20
|
Michigan
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
Washington
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Minnesota*
|
30
|
60
|
10
|
West
Virginia
|
20
|
40
|
10
|
Mississippi*
|
25
|
50
|
25
|
Wisconsin
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Missouri
|
25
|
50
|
10
|
Wyoming
|
25
|
50
|
20
|
* States that changed auto insurance minimums during the 1982-2006 period according to our research.
Variable
Name
|
Variable
Description
|
Mean (Std. Dev.)
|
Traffic fatality rate
(FARS, 2009)
|
Traffic fatalities divided by
state population measured in thousands.
|
0.18
(0.06)
|
Auto insurance minimum
(State-by-State Insurability Requirements, 2009)
|
Per accident minimum
liability amount (in thousands of dollars) adjusted for inflation using GDP
deflator.
|
59.36
(23.53)
|
Young population share
(Ponicki, 2004)
|
Share of people 18-24 years
of age in state population.
|
0.11
(0.01)
|
Old population share
(Ponicki, 2004)
|
Share of people 65 and older
in state population.
|
0.12
(0.02)
|
Minimum drinking age
(Ponicki, 2004)
|
Minimum legal drinking age
for spirits in years.
|
20.59
(0.93)
|
Gasoline price
(EIA, 2009)
|
Per gallon gasoline price in
constant dollars.
|
1.90
(0.41)
|
Income per capita
(BEA, 2009)
|
Real GDP/total population (in
thousands).
|
39.74
(10.38)
|
Population density
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2009)
|
Total population/square mile
of land.
|
0.17
(0.24)
|
Alcohol consumption
(The Beer Institute, 2008)
|
Alcohol consumption in gallons
per capita for state population over the age of 17.
|
2.39
(0.56)
|
Precipitation
(NCDC, 2017; 2017a)
|
Average weighted annual rain
and snow fall in inches.
|
3.09
(1.26)
|
Air temperature
(NCDC, 2017; 2017a)
|
Average weighted annual air
temperature in Fahrenheit.
|
52.50
(7.61)
|
Speed limit
(IIHS, 2017)
|
Average (rural and urban)
speed limit in miles per hour.
|
60.03
(6.15)
|
Crime rate
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2017)
|
Overall crime rate.
|
0.05
(0.01)
|
Primary seatbelt law
(NHTSA, 2009)
|
Dummy variable: 1 if state
has a primary seatbelt law, 0 if otherwise.
|
0.22
(0.42)
|
Compulsory insurance
(Cohen and Dehejia, 2004)
|
Dummy variable=1 if state has
compulsory insurance (0 otherwise).
|
0.73
(0.44)
|
No-fault liability
(Cohen and Dehejia, 2004)
|
Dummy variable=1 if state has
no-fault liability law (0 otherwise).
|
0.28
(0.45)
|
1 FARS (2009) 2 Ponicki (2004) 3 EIA (2009) 4 BEA (2009) 5 U.S. Census Bureau (2009) 6 State-by-State Insurability Requirements (2009) 7 The Beer Institute (2008) 8 NCDC (2017, 2017a) 9 IIHS (2017) 10 Bureau of Justice Statistics (2017) 11 NHTSA (2009) 12 Cohen and Dehejia (2004)
Estimator
standard error
|
FE OLS
|
GMM robust
|
Clustered
|
Driscoll-Kraay
|
Weighted
|
Auto insurance minimum
|
0.096*
|
0.096***
|
0.109***
|
0.108**
|
(0.052)
|
(0.026)
|
(0.026)
|
(0.051)
|
Compulsory insurance
|
0.01
|
0.01
|
0.019**
|
-0.005
|
(0.017)
|
(0.012)
|
(0.008)
|
(0.014)
|
No-fault liability
|
0.023*
|
0.023***
|
0.023***
|
0.013
|
(0.012)
|
(0.004)
|
(0.006)
|
(0.013)
|
Primary seatbelt law
|
-0.009*
|
-0.009***
|
-0.005**
|
-0.000001
|
(0.005)
|
(0.003)
|
(0.002)
|
(0.003)
|
Speed limit
|
0.132
|
0.132**
|
0.179***
|
0.170**
|
(0.123)
|
(0.059)
|
(0.047)
|
(0.084)
|
Minimum drinking age
|
0.179
|
0.179**
|
0.062
|
0.242
|
(0.230)
|
(0.088)
|
(0.117)
|
(0.331)
|
Alcohol consumption
|
0.766***
|
0.766***
|
0.765***
|
0.610***
|
(0.093)
|
(0.091)
|
(0.050)
|
(0.109)
|
Income per capita
|
0.870***
|
0.870***
|
0.676***
|
0.603***
|
(0.169)
|
(0.090)
|
(0.076)
|
(0.101)
|
Gasoline price
|
0.238
|
0.238
|
0.238
|
-0.234
|
(0.351)
|
(0.184)
|
(0.181)
|
(0.224)
|
Population density
|
-0.053
|
-0.053*
|
-0.058*
|
-0.070
|
(0.086)
|
(0.027)
|
(0.035)
|
(0.053)
|
Young population share
|
0.07
|
0.07*
|
0.00737
|
0.139*
|
(0.088)
|
(0.036)
|
(0.041)
|
(0.078)
|
Old population share
|
-0.082
|
-0.082*
|
-0.044
|
-0.177**
|
(0.110)
|
(0.043)
|
(0.048)
|
(0.088)
|
Crime rate
|
0.0581
|
0.0581
|
0.055**
|
0.007
|
(0.044)
|
(0.037)
|
(0.026)
|
(0.036)
|
Precipitation
|
-0.085***
|
-0.085***
|
-0.078***
|
-0.087***
|
(0.019)
|
(0.019)
|
(0.018)
|
(0.020)
|
Air temperature
|
-0.125
|
-0.125
|
-0.258*
|
-0.008
|
(0.158)
|
(0.165)
|
(0.151)
|
(0.179)
|
Lagged dependent variable
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
0.344***
|
(0.051)
|
R-squared
|
0.62
|
0.62
|
0.95
|
--
|
*** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Dependent variable: traffic fatality rate. The reported coefficients are elasticities computed as d(lny)/d(lnx) at variables’ means (dummies are treated as continuous variables for calculating the means). All models include state and year fixed effects, but their coefficients, along with a constant, are not reported. Due to the lack of consistent annual precipitation and temperature data, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the sample, resulting in 48 contiguous states over 25 years or 1,200 observations.
Abbring, J., Chiappori, P. A. and Pinquet, J., 2003. Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(3), pp. 767–820 [ CrossRef]
Abbring, J. H. [et al.], 2003. Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: Can dynamic data help to distinguish? Journal of the European Economic Association, (1), pp. 512–521.
Abbring, J. H., Chiappori, P. A. and Zavadil, T., 2008. Better safe than sorry? Ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data. Discussion Paper, No. 2008-77.
Akerlof, G. A., 1970. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp. 488–500 [ CrossRef]
Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), pp. 277–297 [ CrossRef]
Arrow, K. J., 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review, 53(5), pp. 941–973.
Arrow, K. J., 1970. Insurance, Risk and Resource Allocation in: K. J. Arrow. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 134–143.
Asch, P. and Levy, D., 1990. Young Driver Fatalities: The Roles of Drinking Age and Drinking Experience. Southern Economic Journal, 57(2), pp. 512–520 [ CrossRef]
Beck, L. F. [et al.], 2007. Associations Between Sociodemographics and Safety Belt Use in States With or Without Primary Enforcement Laws. American Journal of Public Health, 97(9), pp. 1619–1624 [ CrossRef]
Calkins, L. N. and Zlatoper, T. J., 2001. The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Motor Vehicle Fatalities in the United States. Social Science Quarterly, 82(4), pp. 716–732 [ CrossRef]
Cohen, A. and Dehejia, R., 2004. The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities. The Journal of Law and Economics, 47(2), pp. 357–393 [ CrossRef]
Cohen, A. and Einav, L., 2003. The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving Behavior and Traffic Fatalities. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(4), pp. 828–843 [ CrossRef]
Cohen, A. and Siegelman, P., 2010. Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(1), pp. 39–84 [ CrossRef]
Cummins, D., Weiss, M. and Phillips, R., 2001. The Incentive Effects of No Fault Automobile Insurance. The Journal of Law and Economics, 44(2), pp. 427–464 [ CrossRef]
Derrig, A. R. [et al.], 2002. The Effect of Population Safety Belt Usage Rates on Motor Vehicle-Related Fatalities. Accidents Analysis and Prevention, 34(1), pp. 101–110 [ CrossRef]
Dionne, G. [et al.], 2005. The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard: Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance. THEMA Working Papers.&
Dionne, G. [et al.], 2011. Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: a Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), pp. 218–227 [ CrossRef]
Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour, M., 2013. Separating Moral Hazard From Adverse Selection And Learning In Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence From France. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), pp. 897–917 [ CrossRef]
Driscoll, J. C. and Kraay, A. C., 1998. Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(4), pp. 549–560 [ CrossRef]
Friedman, L. S., Hedeker, D. and Richter, E. D., 2009. Long-Term Effects of Repealing the National Maximum Speed Limit in the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 99(9), pp. 1626–1631 [ CrossRef]
Garbacz, C., 1990a. Estimating Seat Belt Effectiveness with Seat Belt Usage Data from the Center for Disease Control. Economics Letters, 34(1), pp. 83–88 [ CrossRef]
Garbacz, C., 1990b. How Effective is Automobile Safety Legislation? Applied Economics, 22(12), pp. 1705–1714 [ CrossRef]
Garbacz, C., 1991. Impact of the New Zealand Seat Belt Law. Economic Inquiry, 29(2), pp. 310–316 [ CrossRef]
Garbacz, C., 1992. More Evidence on the Effectiveness of Seat Belt Laws. Applied Economics, 24(3), pp. 313–315 [ CrossRef]
Glassbrenner, D., 2005. Safety Belt Use in 2004 - Demographic Results. Washington: DC: US Department of Transportation. DOT HS 809 848.
Hadi, A., 1992. Identifying Multiple Outliers in Multivariate Data. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological),54(3), pp. 761-771.
Hadi, A., 1994. A Modification of a Method for the Detection of Outliers in Multivariate Samples. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 56(2), pp. 393-396.
Harless, D. W. and Hoffer, G. E., 2003. Testing for Offsetting Behavior and Adverse Recruitment Among Drivers of Airbag-Equipped Vehicles. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 70(4), pp. 629–650 [ CrossRef]
Holmstrom, B., 1979. Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp. 74–92 [ CrossRef]
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W. and Rosen, H. S., 1988. Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data. Econometrica, 56(6), pp. 1371–1395[ CrossRef]
Israel, M., 2004. Do We Drive More Safely When Accidents are More Expensive? Identifying Moral Hazard from Experience Rating Schemes. Working Paper, No. 43. The Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.
Kochanowski, P. S. and Young, M. V., 1985. Deterrent Aspects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 52(2), pp. 269-288 [ CrossRef]
Landes, E., 1982. Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents. The Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1), pp. 49–65 [ CrossRef]
Ma, Y. and Schmit, J., 2000. Factors Affecting the Relative Incidence of Uninsured Motorist Claims. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67(2), pp. 281–294 [ CrossRef]
Nelson, D. E., Bolen, J. and Kresnow, M., 1998. Trends in Safety Belt Use by Demographics and Type of State Safety Belt Law, 1987 through 1993. American Journal of Public Health, 88(2), pp. 245–249 [ CrossRef]
Pauly, M. V., 1968. The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment. American Economic Review, 58(3), pp. 531–537.
Pauly, M. V., 1974. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: The roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(1), pp. 44–62 [ CrossRef]
Peltzman, S., 1975. The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83(4), pp. 667–725 [ CrossRef]
Ponicki, W. R., 2004. Statewide Availability Data System II: 1933 -2003. National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Research Center Grant P60 AA006282-23. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, Prevention Research Center.
Puelz, R. and Snow, A., 1994. Evidence on Adverse Selection : Equilibrium Signaling and Cross Subsidization on the Insurance Market. Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), pp. 236–257 [ CrossRef]
Risa, A. E., 1994. Adverse Incentives from Improved Technology: Traffic Safety Regulation in Norway. Southern Economic Journal, 60(4), pp. 844–857 [ CrossRef]
Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), pp. 629–649 [ CrossRef]
Sen, A., 2001. An Empirical Test of the Offset Hypothesis. Journal of Law and Economics, 44(2), pp. 481–510 [ CrossRef]
Shavell, S., 1979. On Moral Hazard and Insurance. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), pp. 541–562 [ CrossRef]
Viscusi, W. K., 2008. How to value a life. Journal of economics and finance, 32(4), pp. 311–323 [ CrossRef]
Weisburd, S., 2015. Identifying moral hazard in car insurance contracts. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(5), pp. 301–313 [ CrossRef]
Wilson, C., 1977. A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2), pp. 167–207 [ CrossRef]
Zador, P. and Lund, A., 1986. Re-Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 53(2), pp. 226–241 [ CrossRef]
|
|
March, 2018 I/2018
|