Public Sector Economics



On the road again: traffic fatalities and auto insurance minimums

Pavel A. Yakovlev*
Christina M. Orr-Magulick*
Article   |   Year:  2018   |   Pages:  45 - 65   |   Volume:  42   |   Issue:  1
Received:  May 22, 2017   |   Accepted:  November 15, 2017   |   Published online:  March 8, 2018
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  March, 2018
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