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Simulation of an application of the Hartz-IV reform in Austria
Preliminary communication | Year: 2017 | Pages: 479 - 500 | Volume: 41 | Issue: 4 Received: June 30, 2017 | Accepted: September 13, 2017 | Published online: December 11, 2017
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FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
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Gender/children | Unemployment assistance recipients | Members in unemployment-assistance households | Expenditures (related
to unemployment
assistance recipients) | in 1,000 | in % | in 1,000 | in % | in million € | in % | Women | 122 | 41.0 | 270 | 36.6 | 503 | 34.6 | Men | 175 | 59.0 | 296 | 40.2 | 951 | 65.4 | Children | - | - | 171 | 23.2 | - | - | Total | 296 | 100.0 | 736 | 100.0 | 1,454 | 100.0 |
|
Household
type
|
Households
|
Expenditure
|
|
in
1,000
|
in
%
|
in
million €
|
in
%
|
|
Single persons
|
93
|
33.5
|
518
|
35.6
|
|
Couple without children
|
49
|
17.6
|
275
|
18.9
|
|
Other households w/o children*
|
31
|
11.2
|
131
|
9.0
|
|
Single parents
|
19
|
6.9
|
94
|
6.5
|
|
Couple, 1-2 children
|
39
|
14.0
|
179
|
12.3
|
|
Couple, 3+ children
|
16
|
5.9
|
102
|
7.0
|
|
Further households w children**
|
30
|
10.9
|
155
|
10.6
|
|
Total
|
277
|
100.0
|
1,454
|
100.0
|
* Households with more than two adults; ** households with more than two adults and at least one child. Source: Own analysis EU-SILC 2015 (uprated to 2017).
|
Income
types/ paid maintenance
|
Households
|
|
absolute
in 1,000
|
in
% of all 277,000
|
|
Income from work
|
212
|
76.4
|
|
(Other) unemployment benefits
|
207
|
74.7
|
|
Sickness, care benefits
|
155
|
56.0
|
|
Family benefits
|
128
|
46.0
|
|
Capital income
|
117
|
42.2
|
|
Benefits to prevent social exclusion
|
56
|
20.2
|
|
Pensions (incl. for work accidents)
|
56
|
20.2
|
|
Housing benefits
|
53
|
19.1
|
|
Maintenance benefits
|
40
|
14.6
|
|
Income of children <16 years
|
12
|
4.3
|
|
Education benefits
|
10
|
3.8
|
|
Maintenance payments
|
33
|
11.8
|
Scenario | Households in 1.000 | Expenditure in million EUR | Status Quo | Unemployment assistance (UA) | 277 | 1,454 | Benefits against social exclusion/data | 56 | 338 | Total | 277 | 1,792 | Scenario 1: Base without asset check | Minimum income benefit (MIB) simulated | 158 | 781 | Benefits against social exclusion/data | 56 | 338 | MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data (=MIB total) | 179 | 1,119 | Difference unemployment assistance minus. MIB simulated | -119 (-43%) | -673 (-46%) | Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus. MIB total | -98 (-35%) | -673 (-38%) | Scenario 2: Base with asset check capital income | Minimum income benefit simulated | 131 | 670 | Benefits preventing social exclusion/data | 56 | 338 | MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data (=MIB total) | 153 | 1,008 | Difference unemployment assistance minus MIB simulated | -146 (-53%) | -784 (-54%) | Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus MIB total | -124 (-45%) | -784 (-44%) | Scenario 3: Ceiling 1,500 with asset check capital income | Minimum income benefit simulated | 93 | 450 | Benefits preventing social exclusion/data | 42 | 240 | MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data (=MIB total) | 108 | 690 | Difference Unemployment assistance minus MIB simulated | -184 (-66%) | -1,004 (-69%) | Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus MIB total | -169 (-61%) | -1,102 (-61%) |
Gender, children | Original unemployment assistance main recipients | Members in simulated minimum income benefit-households | Expenditure (related to original unemployment assistance main recipients) | in 1,000 | in % | in 1,000 | in % | in million € | in % | Women | 56 | 35.5 | 114 | 32.6 | 247 | 31.6 | Men | 102 | 64.5 | 134 | 38.6 | 534 | 68.4 | Children | - | - | 100 | 28.7 | - | - | Total | 158 | 100,0 | 348 | 100.0 | 781 | 100,0 |
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD and SORESI.
|
Household
type
|
Households
|
Expenditure
|
|
in
1,000
|
in
%
|
in
million €
|
in
%
|
|
Single persons
|
79
|
49.9
|
348
|
44.6
|
|
Couple without children
|
21
|
13.6
|
139
|
17.8
|
|
Other hh w/o children
|
2
|
1.4
|
20
|
2.6
|
|
Single parents
|
15
|
9.6
|
80
|
10.2
|
|
Couple, 1-2 children
|
21
|
13.1
|
104
|
13.3
|
|
Couple, 3+ children
|
10
|
6.3
|
43
|
5.5
|
|
Other hh w children
|
9
|
6.0
|
48
|
6.1
|
|
Total
|
158
|
100.0
|
781
|
100.0
|
Scenario | hh members w reduced inc. in % all | Loss per capita-inc./year | People at risk of poverty in 1,000 | At-risk-of-poverty rate in % | Poverty Gap in % | Gini | Status quo | - | - | 1,137 | 13 | 19 | 0.26 | Basic without asset check (S1) | 80.8 | -1,344 | 1,223 (+86) | 14 | 19 | 0.26 | Basic with asset check capital income (S2) | 82.2 | -1,536 | 1,229 (+92) | 15 | 20 | 0.27 | Ceiling 1,500 with asset check capital income (S3) | 95.3 | -2,292 | 1,292 (+155) | 15 | 20 | 0.27 |
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD/SORESI.
AK (Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte), 2017. Sozialleistungen im Überblick. Lexikon der Ansprüche und Leistungen. Wien: ÖGB-Verlag.
Baethge-Kinsky V., Bartelheimer P. and Wagner, A., 2010. Die "Hartz-Gesetze", ihre wissenschaftliche Evaluation und deren Verarbeitung. Schlussbericht des Transferprojekts „Monitor Arbeitsmarktpolitik“. Göttingen ; Berlin: Sozio-logisches Forschungsinstitut Göttingen an der Georg-August-Universität gefördert von der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung und der Otto-Brenner-Stiftung.
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Fuchs M., 2009. Nicht-Inanspruchnahme von Sozialleistungen am Beispiel der Sozialhilfe in: N. Dimmel, K. Heitzmann and M. Schenk, eds. Handbuch Armut in Österreich. Innsbruck: Studienverlag Innsbruck, pp. 290-301.
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Matsaganis, M., Ozdemir E. and Ward, T., 2014. The Coverage Rate of Social Benefits, European Commission Social Situation Observatory. Research Note, No. 9.
Mundt, A. and Amann, W., 2015. Bestandsaufnahme von monetären Leistungen für untere Einkommensgruppen zur Deckung des Wohnbedarfs, Studie im Auftrag des Sozialministeriums. Wien: Institut für Immobilien, Bauen und Wohnen.
Pratscher, K., 2016. Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung der Bundesländer im Jahr 2015. Statische Nachrichten, (11), pp. 846-858.
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Sutherland, H. and Figari, F., 2013. EUROMOD: the European Union tax-benefit microsimulation model. International Journal of Microsimulation, 1(6), pp. 4-26.
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December, 2017
IV/2017
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