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Tax mimicking in Spanish municipalities: expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition, or tax competition?
Francisco Bastida* 
Francisco Bastida
Affiliation: University of Murcia-Facultad Economía y Empresa, Campus Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo-Murcia, Spain ; American University of Armenia-Manoogian Simone College of Business & Economics, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia
 0000-0001-9875-3817
Correspondence
alba@um.es
Bernardino Benito*
Bernardino Benito
Affiliation: University of Murcia-Facultad Economía y Empresa, Campus Espinardo, Spain
0000-0003-2165-994X
María-Dolores Guillamón*
María-Dolores Guillamón
Affiliation: University of Murcia-Facultad Economía y Empresa, Campus Espinardo, Spain
0000-0001-7331-5167
Ana-María Ríos*
Ana-María Ríos
Affiliation: University of Murcia-Facultad Economía y Empresa, Campus Espinardo, Spain
0000-0002-7783-288X
Article | Year: 2019 | Pages: 115 - 139 | Volume: 43 | Issue: 2 Received: April 12, 2019 | Accepted: May 8, 2019 | Published online: June 10, 2019
|
FULL ARTICLE
FIGURES & DATA
REFERENCES
CROSSMARK POLICY
METRICS
LICENCING
PDF
|
Variable
|
Calculation
|
Literature
|
Mean
|
Std. dev.
|
Min
|
Max
|
|
uproptaxrate
|
Tax rate to be multiplied by tax base (urban
property value)
|
Solé-Ollé (2003), Lyytikäinen (2012), Baskaran (2014), Allers and Elhorst
(2005), Isen (2014), etc.
|
.62
|
.17
|
.2
|
1.23
|
|
neig_uproptaxrate
|
Average neighboring uproptaxrate
|
.62
|
.13
|
.35
|
1.14
|
|
cartaxaveragerate
|
Vehicle tax liability of municipality i, year t
/Minimum vehicle tax liability according to law 2/2004, year t
|
Besley and Case (1995), Solé-Ollé (2003), Delgado,
Lago‐Peñas and Mayor (2015)
|
1.35
|
.29
|
1
|
2
|
|
neig_cartaxaveragerate
|
Average neighboring cartaxaveragerate
|
1.36
|
.23
|
1
|
2.00
|
|
r_revenue1pc
|
Municipal direct and indirect taxes per capita (real
2002 €)
|
Solé-Ollé (2003)
|
251.76
|
199.26
|
23.37
|
5633.85
|
|
r_transfpc
|
Transfers received from upper-level governments per
capita (real 2002 €)
|
Revelli (2001), Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli
(2003), Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), Lyytikäinen (2012), Delgado, Lago‐Peñas and Mayor
(2015), Edmark and Ågren (2008), Baskaran (2014)
|
377.75
|
203.29
|
45.24
|
4228.01
|
|
income
|
Per capita income of the
municipality (real 2002 income levels). Ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10
(highest).
|
Besley and Case (1995), Brett and Pinkse (2000),
Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Gérard, Jayet
and Paty (2010), Edmark and Ågren (2008), Lyytikäinen
(2012), Cassette, Di Porto and Foremny (2012)
|
5.15
|
2.30
|
1
|
10
|
|
unemploy
|
Unemployment rate (%)
|
Besley and Case (1995), Revelli (2001), Bordignon,
Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Gérard, Jayet
and Paty (2010), Lyytikäinen (2012), Cassette, Di
Porto and Foremny (2012), Edmark and Ågren (2008), Delgado, Lago‐Peñas and Mayor
(2015)
|
8.56
|
4.97
|
.5
|
36.97
|
|
lnpopul
|
natural logarithm of
municipality population
|
Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Heyndels
and Vuchelen (1998), Delgado, Lago‐Peñas and Mayor (2015), Brett and Pinkse (2000), Edmark
and Ågren (2008)
|
8.63
|
1.21
|
6.90
|
15.00
|
|
r_housevalue
|
Tax base (real estate value)
according to municipal government’s urban property value (real 2002 thousand €)
|
Oates (1969)
|
30.43
|
23.11
|
2.65
|
196.83
|
|
MCideology
|
Municipal Council political sign (0 left; 1
right)
|
Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Edmark and
Ågren (2008), Delgado, Lago‐Peñas and Mayor (2015)
|
.49
|
.49
|
0
|
1
|
|
Variable
|
Calculation
|
Literature
|
Mean
|
|
majority
|
Majority of one party in municipal council=1, 0 otherwise
|
Solé-Ollé (2003), (2016), Delgado, Lago‐Peñas and Mayor (2015), Fiva and Rattsø (2007), Roubini
and Sachs (1989)
|
.66
|
|
munelectionyear
|
Dummy election year
(1 election year; 0 no election year)
|
Besley and
Case (1995), Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003), Edmark and Ågren (2008), Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2010), Isen (2014)
|
.25
|
|
munpreelection
|
Dummy pre-election year
(1 pre-election year; 0 no pre-election year)
|
.26
|
|
munpostelection
|
Dummy post-election year
(1 post-election year; 0 no post-election year)
|
.23
|
|
dumm_yearvaluerev
|
Property values have been updated by the municipality i in year t=1, 0
otherwise
|
Revelli
(2002), Solé-Olle (2003)
|
.03
|
|
bipartisan
|
Municipal ruling party belongs to the two main
national parties
(1 belongs to one of the two main political parties;
0 doesn’t belong)
|
Revelli
(2002)
|
.74
|
|
nation
|
National government alignment with municipal government. If both are
conservative or both are progressive, dummy takes value 1. Value 0 otherwise
|
Brett and
Pinkse (2000)
|
.52
|
|
region
|
Regional government alignment with municipal government. If both are
conservative or both are progressive, dummy takes value 1. Value 0 otherwise
|
.62
|
|
cgov_1
|
Takes 1 if there was one change in municipal government stemming from
elections in 2002-2013. Takes 0 otherwise.
|
Edmark and
Ågren (2008)
|
.28
|
|
cgov_2
|
Takes 1 if there were two changes in municipal government stemming from elections
in 2002-2013. Takes 0 otherwise.
|
.29
|
|
cgov_3
|
Takes 1 if there were three changes in municipal government stemming from
elections in 2002-2013. Takes 0 otherwise.
|
.13
|
|
autcom
|
Autonomous community (region) where the municipality is located
|
Besley and
Case (1995), Isen (2014)
|
Non reported
|
Variable income is only available as a discrete variable in levels 1-10 for the time window. It was constructed by the Klein Institute (Autonomous University of Madrid). Descriptive statistics of variable autcom are not reported because they are not relevant for the analysis. They are N-1 dummy variables representing the region where the municipality is located. Thus, 16 more rows would make the table more complex, without adding meaningful information for the reader.
|
Dependent
variable
|
uproptaxrate
|
|
Estimation
method
|
GMM
|
IV
|
|
Sample
|
Whole sample
|
Sub-samples
|
Whole sample
|
Sub-samples
|
|
Basic model
|
Interaction
|
Majority = 0
|
Majority = 1
|
Basic model
|
Interaction
|
Majority = 0
|
Majority = 1
|
|
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
8
|
9
|
|
neig_uproptaxrate
|
*** .2576
8.90
|
*** .2466
9.65
|
*** .1772
3.78
|
*** .2366
7.10
|
*** .0196
3.29
|
*** .0211
3.41
|
.0239
0.37
|
** .1207
2.50
|
|
uproptaxrate (t-1)
|
*** .9543
39.83
|
*** .9292
41.92
|
*** .9125
32.30
|
*** .9327
31.53
|
*** .9411
198.27
|
*** .9407
199.42
|
*** .7594
24.09
|
*** .6557
18.25
|
|
r_revenue1pc (t-1)
|
-.0000
-0.98
|
-.0000
-0.33
|
.0000
0.60
|
.0000
0.14
|
.0001
1.14
|
.0001
0.95
|
* -.0001
-1.95
|
*** -.0001
-4.28
|
|
r_transfpc (t-1)
|
*** -.0000
-2.83
|
*** -.0000
-3.62
|
-.0000
-1.52
|
*** -.0000
-3.65
|
.0000
0.51
|
.0000
0.44
|
.0000
0.30
|
** .0001
2.33
|
|
income (t-1)
|
*** -.0027
-5.88
|
*** -.0027
-6.36
|
*** -.0037
-4.03
|
*** -.0034
-5.87
|
*** -.0263
-2.79
|
*** -.0265
-2.81
|
** -.0261
-2.39
|
.0007
0.14
|
|
unemploy (t-1)
|
* .0003
1.77
|
*** .0006
4.09
|
** .0008
2.51
|
*** .0006
3.36
|
*** -.0213
-3.18
|
*** -.0213
-3.16
|
.0056
0.38
|
** -.0224
-2.25
|
|
lnpopul (t-1)
|
* .0022
1.95
|
*** .0026
2.69
|
*** .0047
3.41
|
* .0020
1.66
|
-.0014
-1.00
|
-.0014
-0.97
|
-.1580
-1.63
|
-.0186
-0.29
|
|
r_housevalue (t-1)
|
*** -.0004
-6.49
|
*** -.0004
-7.83
|
*** -.0006
-7.44
|
*** -.0003
-5.00
|
*** -.0005
-7.92
|
*** -.0005
-8.10
|
*** -.0005
-3.80
|
-.0004
-1.45
|
|
MCideology (t-1)
|
*** .0298
4.76
|
*** .0175
3.58
|
* .0131
1.82
|
.0012
0.16
|
-.0011
-0.78
|
-.0014
-0.94
|
.0015
0.30
|
-.0072
-1.09
|
|
majority (t-1)
|
-.0023
-0.31
|
-.0059
-1.12
|
|
|
.0016
1.36
|
.0012
1.06
|
|
|
|
munelectionyear
|
*** -.0083
-9.19
|
*** -.0097
-11.50
|
*** -.0147
-8.35
|
*** -.0075
-7.14
|
** .0373
2.57
|
*** .0377
2.60
|
-.0184
-0.98
|
-.0094
-0.81
|
|
munpreelection
|
*** -.0082
-8.98
|
*** -.0092
-10.83
|
*** -.0107
-6.26
|
*** -.0071
-7.16
|
*** .0397
2.78
|
*** .0398
2.78
|
.0104
0.44
|
** .0401
2.05
|
|
munpostelection
|
.0003
0.37
|
-.0001
-0.15
|
*** -.0050
-2.79
|
** .0026
2.23
|
*** .0351
3.88
|
*** .0354
3.92
|
-.0045
-0.35
|
-.0212
-1.33
|
|
dumm_yearvaluerev
(t-1)
|
** -.0105
-2.13
|
-.0073
-1.45
|
-.0085
-1.14
|
-.0044
-0.74
|
*** -.0078
-2.81
|
*** -.0078
-2.81
|
.0044
0.55
|
.0061
0.90
|
|
bipartisan (t-1)
|
** .0150
2.36
|
** .0103
2.41
|
.0058
0.93
|
** .0220
2.49
|
.0006
0.42
|
.0003
0.21
|
-.0046
-0.66
|
.0004
0.05
|
|
nation (t-1)
|
*** .0163
4.89
|
*** .0102
4.28
|
.0040
0.77
|
*** .0121
4.28
|
*** -.0040
-2.63
|
*** -.0041
-2.67
|
** -.0103
-2.10
|
.0014
0.44
|
|
region (t-1)
|
.0030
0.74
|
.0016
0.51
|
* -.0089
-1.88
|
.0042
1.41
|
-.0006
-0.56
|
-.0007
-0.67
|
.0031
0.58
|
-.0003
-0.07
|
|
cgov_1xneig_uptaxrate
|
|
-.0049
-0.81
|
|
|
|
-.0024
-1.18
|
|
|
|
cgov_2xneig_uptaxrate
|
|
-.0060
-0.99
|
|
|
|
-.0016
-0.75
|
|
|
|
cgov_3xneig_uptaxrate
|
|
-.0025
-0.32
|
|
|
|
-.0032
-1.21
|
|
|
|
m(2) test
|
z = 1.89
Pr = .059
|
z = 1.81
Pr = .070
|
z = 0.68
Pr = .500
|
z = 1.15
Pr = .251
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hansen test
|
chi2= 808
Prob = .000
|
chi2= 1016
Prob = .000
|
chi2= 454
Prob = .002
|
chi2= 595
Prob = .000
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hausman
|
|
|
|
|
chi2 = 20
Prob = 0.467
RE
|
chi2 = 22
Prob = 0.455
RE
|
chi2 = 877
Prob = 0.000
FE
|
chi2 = 474
Prob = 0.000
FE
|
|
R-sq overall
|
|
|
|
|
0.8933
|
0.8937
|
0.2313
|
0.4531
|
All models include: - A constant, which is not shown.
- Dummy variables for Spanish regions, which are not shown. This variable adds to the income variable (income) to control for differences in economic development among Spanish regions (autonomous communities).
Below each coefficient, z value is reported. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. RE= random effects IV regression. FE= fixed effects IV regression. IV regression: Instrumented variables= neig_uproptaxrate r_revenue1pc r_transfpc income unemploy. Instruments= lnpopul, munelectionyear, munpreelection, munpostelection, r_debtpc cartaxaveragerate, propimmigrants, dumm_yearvaluerev
|
Dependent
variable
|
cartaxaveragerate
|
|
Estimation
method
|
GMM
|
IV
|
|
Sample
|
Whole sample
|
Sub-samples
|
Whole sample
|
Sub-samples
|
|
Basic model
|
Interaction
|
Majority = 0
|
Majority = 1
|
Basic model
|
Interaction
|
Majority = 0
|
Majority = 1
|
|
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
8
|
9
|
|
neig_cartaxaveragerate
|
*** .0571
4.47
|
*** .0520
4.41
|
* .0362
1.80
|
** .0346
2.35
|
*** .7573
2.93
|
*** .1813
4.89
|
*** .2608
4.83
|
*** .4249
8.20
|
|
cartaxaveragerate
(t-1)
|
*** .8943
48.48
|
*** .9026
52.87
|
*** .9431
43.05
|
*** .9165
44.93
|
*** .4317
9.60
|
*** 1.1178
28.39
|
*** .6133
31.85
|
*** .6093
45.62
|
|
r_revenue1pc (t-1)
|
** -.0000
-2.51
|
* -.0000
-1.86
|
*** -.0000
|
* -.0000
-1.82
|
* .0005
1.66
|
*** -.0004
-4.96
|
.0082
1.23
|
** -.0109
-2.56
|
|
r_transfpc (t-1)
|
-.0000
-1.60
|
*** -.0000
-2.64
|
.0000
0.18
|
** -.0000
-2.36
|
*** -.0002
-2.92
|
* .0003
1.71
|
.0015
0.43
|
** -.0059
-2.38
|
|
income (t-1)
|
*** -.0014
-3.44
|
** -.0010
-2.50
|
** -.0024
-2.44
|
*** -.0016
-2.84
|
-.0353
-1.60
|
*** .0987
4.70
|
.0004
0.37
|
* .0016
1.77
|
|
unemploy (t-1)
|
* -.0004
-1.87
|
*** -.0005
-2.69
|
*** -.0018
-4.80
|
-.0003
-1.22
|
-.0047
-1.15
|
*** -.0298
-5.49
|
-.0000
-0.05
|
-.0002
-0.41
|
|
lnpopul (t-1)
|
*** .0153
7.95
|
*** .0137
7.79
|
*** .0116
4.63
|
*** .0139
7.07
|
.1141
1.06
|
-.0236
-1.29
|
** .0485
2.34
|
-.0173
-1.19
|
|
r_housevalue (t-1)
|
*** -.0001
-4.75
|
*** -.0002
-5.57
|
*** -.0002
-4.00
|
*** -.0001
-2.78
|
-.0002
-1.05
|
** -.0004
-2.33
|
*** -.0085
-2.80
|
*** -.0090
-4.04
|
|
MCideology (t-1)
|
*** -.0195
-3.74
|
*** -.0170
-3.78
|
.0023
0.31
|
*** -.0225
-2.99
|
.0015
0.22
|
-.0078
-1.23
|
-.0037
-1.44
|
*** -.0093
-3.07
|
|
majority (t-1)
|
.0025
0.41
|
-.0048
-1.01
|
|
|
-.0038
-0.64
|
-.0076
-1.39
|
|
|
|
munelectionyear
|
*** -.0126
-14.54
|
*** -.0115
-13.59
|
*** -.0148
-7.62
|
*** -.0107
-10.05
|
.0032
0.27
|
*** .0633
3.49
|
*** -.0134
-4.68
|
*** -.0088
-3.85
|
|
munpreelection
|
*** -.0086
-9.05
|
*** -.0079
-8.56
|
*** -.0091
-4.21
|
*** -.0073
-6.45
|
.0171
1.45
|
** .0237
2.15
|
*** -.0085
-3.18
|
*** -.0062
-3.02
|
|
munpostelection
|
*** .0044
3.80
|
*** .0053
5.27
|
.0000
0.02
|
*** .0067
4.80
|
.0079
1.53
|
*** .1072
5.62
|
.0007
0.27
|
*** .0071
3.93
|
|
dumm_yearvaluerev
(t-1)
|
** .0079
2.52
|
*** .0108
3.42
|
.0054
0.91
|
.0033
1.01
|
.0044
0.89
|
-.0108
-1.12
|
** .0103
2.44
|
.0052
1.58
|
|
bipartisan (t-1)
|
*** -.0200
-3.73
|
-.0037
-0.79
|
-.0080
-1.37
|
-.0050
-0.59
|
.0115
1.58
|
* .0113
1.86
|
-.0048
-1.70
|
-.0065
-1.71
|
|
nation (t-1)
|
-.0019
-0.76
|
-.0033
-1.59
|
-.0047
-0.93
|
-.0038
-1.60
|
-.0002
-0.05
|
*** -.0159
-3.28
|
.0006
0.31
|
** -.0034
-2.27
|
|
region (t-1)
|
-.0033
-0.91
|
.0019
0.64
|
.0052
1.04
|
** .0058
2.00
|
-.0003
-0.06
|
-.0011
-0.17
|
* .0044
1.90
|
-.0012
-0.53
|
|
cgov_1xneig_cartaxrate
|
|
-.0009
-0.50
|
|
|
|
-.0022
-0.61
|
|
|
|
cgov_2xneig_cartaxrate
|
|
-.0004
-0.20
|
|
|
|
.0013
0.29
|
|
|
|
cgov_3xneig_cartaxrate
|
|
-.0026
-0.94
|
|
|
|
-.0052
-1.14
|
|
|
|
m(2) test
|
z = -0.02
Pr = 0.983
|
z = -0.04
Pr = 0.966
|
z = -1.00
Pr = 0.318
|
z = 0.99
Pr = 0.321
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hansen test
|
chi2= 607
Prob = .000
|
chi2= 840
Prob = .000
|
chi2= 440
Prob = .006
|
chi2= 464
Prob = .001
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hausman
|
|
|
|
|
chi2 = 7584
Prob = .000
FE
|
chi2 = 11
Prob = .885
RE
|
chi2 = 1843
Prob = .000
FE
|
chi2 = 665
Prob = .000
FE
|
|
R-sq overall
|
|
|
|
|
0.6487
|
0.6693
|
0.9134
|
0.8221
|
All models include: - A constant, which is not shown.
- Dummy variables for Spanish regions, which are not shown. This variable adds to the income variable to control for differences in economic development among Spanish regions (autonomous communities).
Below each coefficient, z value is reported. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. IV regression: Instrumented variables= neig_uproptaxrate r_revenue1pc r_transfpc income unemploy. Instruments= lnpopul, munelectionyear, munpreelection, munpostelection, r_debtpc cartaxaveragerate, propimmigrants, dumm_yearvaluerev.
|
|
|
Variable description
|
|
Dependent
variable
|
movetoneigh
|
Neighbors’
population change / municipalityi population change.
Population change= populationt / populationt-1
|
|
uproptax_rel (t-1)
|
.0061
0.92
|
Average of neighbors’
urban property tax rate / municipalityi urban property tax rate
|
|
cartax_rel (t-1)
|
-.0003
-0.48
|
Average of neighbors’
car tax rate / municipalityi car tax rate
|
|
income_rel (t-1)
|
.0013
0.63
|
Average of neighbors’
income level / municipalityi income level
|
|
unemploy_rel (t-1)
|
.0034
1.25
|
Average of neighbors’
unemployment rate / municipalityi unemployment rate
|
|
r_housevalue_rel
(t-1)
|
.0000
0.24
|
Average of neighbors’
real house value / municipalityi real house value
|
|
r_transfpc (t-1)
|
-.0000
-1.22
|
See table 1
|
|
MCideology (t-1)
|
.0056
1.18
|
|
majority (t-1)
|
-.0021
-0.49
|
|
munelectionyear
|
*** .0020
2.78
|
|
munpreelection
|
*** .0022
2.84
|
|
munpostelection
|
*** .0017
2.83
|
|
dumm_yearvaluerev (t-1)
|
-.0048
-1.29
|
|
bipartisan (t-1)
|
*** .0182
2.62
|
|
nation (t-1)
|
.0049
1.63
|
|
región (t-1)
|
.0006
0.18
|
|
propimmigrants(t-1)
|
.0142
0.66
|
Municipalityi
immigrant population / Municipalityi total population
|
|
m(2) test
|
z = 0.45
Pr = 0.656
|
|
|
Hansen test
|
chi2= 82.65
Prob = .338
|
|
All models include: - A constant, which is not shown.
- Dummy variables for Spanish regions, which are not shown.
Below each coefficient, z value is reported. Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
|
uproptaxrate
|
|
Group
|
Obs
|
Mean
|
Std. Err.
|
Std. Dev.
|
Significance
|
|
0 (left-wing)
|
11,683
|
*** .6333
|
. 0015
|
. 1627
|
t = 8.3309
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
|
|
1
(right-wing)
|
11,427
|
*** .6151248
|
. 0016
|
. 1694
|
|
cartaxaveragerate
|
|
0 (left-wing)
|
11,683
|
*** 1.3852
|
.0026
|
.2840
|
t = 13.8303
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
|
|
1
(right-wing)
|
11,427
|
*** 1.3328
|
.0027
|
.2919
|
Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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June, 2019
II/2019
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