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The role of pay-for-performance in promoting integrated care



Sverre Grepperud*
   
Pål Andreas Pedersen*
Article   |   Year:  2025   |   Pages:  563 - 590   |   Volume:  49   |   Issue:  4
Received:  March 19, 2025   |   Accepted:  September 1, 2025   |   Published online:  December 2, 2025
Download citation        https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.49.4.3       


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   December, 2025
IV/2025
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